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THREE ESSAYS ON THE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
PROGRAMS
Sunita Mondal, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
This dissertation consists of three chapters, each evaluating a di¤erent public policy. The
rst chapter studies the e¤ect of internet on music sales. Internet usage has increased
dramatically over the past few years. Concurrently, the sales from music CDs have witnessed
a huge decline. I analyze the e¤ect of downloading music on the current downturn in CD sales
by looking at the progressive disappearance of the traditional stores. To identify the causal
impact of downloading and control for endogeneity, I instrument state internet penetration
rates by information on the adoption of Video Franchise Law (VFL). Results indicates that
implementation of VFL increases internet access in states which adopt it, and explains 58.7
percent of total store closings in those states.
The second chapter analyzes whether enactment of the federal Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) di¤erentially a¤ected states that previously implemented maternity leave laws
at the state level than those states which did not. Additionally, we study whether FMLA
caused an increase in female employment and labor force participation in those states that
expanded its benets and relaxed the eligibility criteria. Finally, we analyze the Paid Family
Leave program in California, comparing how the change in female employment di¤ers from
those states which have FMLA alone and those which have complemented the benets of
FMLA. Our results conrm the positive and signicant e¤ect of FMLA on female employment
and also a signicantly positive impact on female employment for some states when they
complement the benets and eligibility criteria of FMLA.
The third chapter analyses labor market impacts of the implementation of all the state
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and local governmentsEITC supplement. We examine whether the substantial expansions
in the EITC program created by these supplements are an e¤ective means of providing
work incentives. Exploiting variation in the policy over time both across states and within
states between di¤erent demographic groups, we nd the EITC supplements have raised
labor supply among single women, but had no e¤ect on the labor supply of married women.
Our results indicate the state and local governmentsEITC expansions to be less e¤ective
compared to the federal EITC expansions.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.0 THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNET ON MUSIC SALES . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Research Design and the Identication Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 Exogeneity of the Video Franchise Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Data and Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.2 OLS Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.3 Reduced-form Estimation and Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.4 Falsication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.0 THE EFFECTOFPARENTAL LEAVEONFEMALE EMPLOYMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM STATE POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Overview of parental leave laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Research design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4.1 Identication Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.6 Empirical results for female employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
v
3.7 Analysis of FMLA in states with and without TDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.7.1 Analysis of the results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.8 Analysis of extensions of FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.9 Analysis of Californias Paid Family Leave program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.0 THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF STATE AND LOCAL EX-
PANSIONS OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT . . . . . . . . 66
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Structure of Federal and State EITC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Previous Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Data and Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4.1 Data Sources and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.0 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
vi
LIST OF TABLES
1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Summary Statistics: Store closures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Summary Statistics: Rural versus Urban States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4 OLS Estimates of the E¤ect of State Internet Penetration Rates on Store closures 25
5 First Stage Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on State Internet Pene-
tration Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6 First Stage Estimates of the E¤ect of phone measures on State Internet Pene-
tration Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7 Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures . . 32
8 Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of phone measures on Store closures . . 32
9 2SLS Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures . . . . . . . 33
10 Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures con-
trolling for the presence of megastores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12 Summary Statistics: California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
13 The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law and states
with TDI before FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
14 The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law and states
with TDI before FMLA, by education groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
15 The estimates of FLFP rates between states with no law and states with TDI
before FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
vii
16 The estimates of FLFP rates between states with no law and states with TDI
before FMLA, by education groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
17 The estimates of FLFP rates between Oregon and states with no law before
FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
18 The estimates of Female Employment between Oregon and states with no law
before FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
19 The estimates of Female Labor Force Participation rates between Maine and
states with no law before FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
20 The estimates of FLFP rates between California and states with no law before
FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
21 The estimates of FLFP rates between California and states with which ex-
panded FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
22 Federal EITC rate schedule 1975-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
23 State EITC supplements (1984-2006, percentages of the federal credit) . . . . 73
24 Labor Force participation rates by demographic groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
25 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
26 2SLS Estimates of the E¤ect of Phone measures on Store closures . . . . . . . 83
27 Store closures based on the type of store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
28 Summary Statistics: Store closures based on the type of store between states 84
29 OLS Estimates of E¤ect of State Internet Penetration Rates on Store closures
based on the type of store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
30 Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures based
on the type of store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
31 First Stage Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on State Internet Pene-
tration Rates: Falsication test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
32 Reduced Form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on State Internet
Penetration Rates: Falsication test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
33 Estimated Probit Models for the Adoption of Video Franchise Laws . . . . . 86
34 Regression of VFL adoption on state characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
35 Reduced-form regression including additional covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
viii
36 Falsication: The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law
and states with TDI before FMLA assuming FMLA adopted in 1981 . . . . . 88
37 The estimates of Female Labor Force Participation rates between Connecticut
and states with no law before FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
38 The estimates of FLFP rates between Vermont and states with no law before
FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
39 The estimates of Female Employment between California and states with no
law before FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
40 The estimates of Female Employment between California and states which
expanded FMLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
41 Weekly Benet amount and Duration of Benets in TDI states . . . . . . . . 91
42 Classication of the States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Trends in home internet access 2000 to 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 CD sales revenue gures 1995 to 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 First-Stage relationship between states that adopted VFL and the Internet
penetration rates in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 Total number of Store closures from 2003 through 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5 States which adopted VFL in 2005, 2006 and 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6 Map of the states with store closings in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7 First-Stage:VFL states and the Internet penetration rates in 2007 . . . . . . . . . 26
8 Internet Penetration predicted by 1960 phone ownership rates . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9 Total number of Store closures from 2003 through 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10 Reduced-form:store closings and VFL adoption by states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11 Parental leave laws: 1942-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
12 Theoretical predictions of mandated leave policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
13 Federal EITC schedule, Single Parent Family 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
14 Federal EITC Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
x
PREFACE
I must start by giving sincere thanks to my Ph.D. Advisor and friend Professor Alexis
León for his helpful discussions and encouragement: from the initial conversations of the
di¤erent research ideas included in this Ph.D.thesis from its most initial stage to the writing
and re-writing stages. I am especially grateful to him, as he has strongly encouraged me
to pursuit my research, provided me with valuable guidance and the most insightful com-
ments, and has helped me throughout to improve the quality of my work. I owe a great
debt of gratitude to Professor Mark Hoekstra, who constantly and carefully read even the
most preliminary drafts of new research ideas, and provided very interesting suggestions and
comments about how to enrich the results from my research. I also owe thanks to Professor
Daniel Berkowitz, Professor Shanti Rabindran and Professor Sourav Bhattacharya for all
their helpful suggestions and comments. I would like to thank all participants of the 14th
Annual Meeting of the Society of Labor Economists, at Boston for their insightful comments
and suggestions. I would also like to thank all participants of the 71st Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Economics Association, at Minnesota for their thoughtful comments. I must also
thank my peers and very good friends in the graduate program Ana Espinola, Felix Munoz
Garcia, Sandra Orozco, Heriberto Gonzalez and Jared Lunsford, with whom I shared some
of the most exciting and fruitful years, and with whom I faced many of the usual challenges
of a demanding graduate program. I am extremely blessed of having them as friends. You
have been a big support through the most di¢ cult times of my life and you will always be
a family to me. Thanks are also due to the Department of Economics of the University of
Pittsburgh, all my research would not have been possible without its trust and support.
I must also express my gratitude to all my Professors at the University of Pittsburgh for
becoming my inspiration, not only as researchers, but also as teachers. I want to specially
thank all members of the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh, from
secretaries to classmates, for all their understanding both during good and di¢ cult times,
and the extremely comfortable work environment that they promoted.
Above all, I would like to thank my husband, Sujit Mondal and my daughter Sreyashi
xi
Mondal, without the love, support, trust and utmost understanding of whom, my research
would not have been possible, and my father Samir Kumar Hazra, for his constant advice,
support and encouragement and for being my inspiration as a teacher. They have been my
main support and motivation during all these years. This thesis is dedicated to all three of
you.
xii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
My dissertation focuses on the study of the impact of di¤erent public policy programs. The
broad objective is to empirically investigate how the implementation of policies enacted
at the federal and state governments level have a¤ected the retail industry as well as the
labor market outcomes in various sectors of the economy. Specically, I study how the
implementation of a franchising law varies the availability of internet services across di¤erent
states and hence a¤ects the sale of music. I further study the impact of various state and
federal maternity leave policies on female labor supply and nally analyze how the state and
local governments supplements of the Earned Income Tax Credit policy has a¤ected the
female employment.
The rst chapter, The E¤ect of the Internet on Music Sales, examines how the arrival of
the digital technology in the form of increased internet usage is posing a threat to the survival
of the traditional brick and mortar businesses. In order to address this issue, I specically
consider the case study of the music industry, since the music retail has been adversely
a¤ected by an advent of the internet as a major distribution channel of music in digital
form. Over the past few years, with an increase in internet usage there has been a concurrent
decline in the sale from music CDs. Previous literature (Zentner 2006, Oberholzer-Gee and
Strumpf, 2007) have analyzed the e¤ect of le sharing on record sales but there has not been
a consensus regarding its detrimental e¤ect on music sales. In this chapter, I use two sources
of exogenous variation in the internet access across US states to measure the impact of music
downloads on the progressive disappearance of the traditional music CD stores. Given that
the sale of CDs is the most important source of revenue for the music industry, and the record
stores represent a major share of this revenue, it is crucial to estimate the extent to which a
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change in the consumer preference in the form of downloading music is causing a decline in
the old format. The goal is to analyze whether an increase in the availability of broadband
internet service, which allows for faster access to music downloads and may thus reduce the
demand for physical CDs, has a¤ected the number of CD store closings in a given region over
a period of time. Establishing a causal e¤ect of an increased internet access on store closings
is di¢ cult due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in a taste for music as well as
the potential problem of reverse causality. To address these concerns, I use information on
the passage of Video Franchise Law (VFL) and the di¤erences in the household telephone
adoption rate in the 1960 Census as two sources of exogenous variation in the availability
of the internet access across the states. Employing an instrumental variable (IV) estimation
strategy and using CPS Computer and Internet Use Supplements data for state internet
penetration rates and CD store closings data from the research group Almighty Institute of
Music Retail, I nd that the implementation of VFL signicantly increases the availability
of internet access in the states which adopt it, and explains about 58.7 percent of the total
store closings in those states. As a second set of instruments for state internet penetration
rates, I use the 1960 Census data on the household telephone adoption rates to identify a
variation across states in online access, and nd that internet has di¤used faster in states
with historically higher rates of telephone adoption which in turn causes a signicantly higher
number of music store closures in these states.
The second chapter, The E¤ect of Parental Leave on Female Employment: Evidence
from State Policies(joint work with Ana Espinola Arredondo) examines the e¤ect of federal
and state parental leave policies on female labor market outcomes. We study the impact
of three distinct leave policies on female employment, the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) which is a federal policy, the state expansions of the FMLA, and nally the Paid
Family Leave program implemented by California. Researches on the e¤ect of such policies
are particularly important given the recent increasing trends in employment of women with
young children. We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in di¤erences estimation strategy and
data from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) to conduct our analysis. In
contrary to the previous research (Waldfogel, 1999) which fails to nd an e¤ect of FMLA on
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female employment, we show that the introduction of the FMLA has a signicantly positive
impact on the employment of women in those states which had no state law providing
parental leave benets compared to the states applying the Temporary Disability Insurance
(TDI) before FMLA was enacted. Further, we nd that the impact of FMLA expansion on
female employment and labor force participation has been signicantly higher in the states
with most generous expansions (in terms of improving the benets and relaxing the eligibility
criteria of FMLA) compared to the states which did not expand FMLA. Finally, in order to
get an intuitive understanding of the e¤ects of further increases in the generosity levels of
parental leave policies, we consider the recent enactment of Californias Paid Family Leave
program. Specically, we nd no impact of the introduction of this law on the female labor
market outcomes, primarily due to a low-take up rates which results from a lack of worker
awareness of the available benets provided by the Paid Family Leave program.
The third chapter The Labor Market E¤ects of State and Local Expansions of the
Earned Income Tax Credit(joint work with Alexis León) analyzes the labor market impacts
of the implementation of all the state and local governmentsEITC supplement using March
Current Population Survey data from 1984 to 2008. Previous literature (Eissa and Liebman,
1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001) have established the signicant positive impact of the
federal EITC on the labor force participation rates of single women with children. The
contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is threefold. Firstly, it serves as a further
test for the theory of labor force participation and labor supply, and contributes to answering
the question of whether EITC payments by state and local governments a¤ect participation
in the same way as the federal EITC does. Secondly, it helps to access the e¤ectiveness of
these state programs, that is, whether the EITC programs are indeed an e¤ective means
of boosting labor force participation in a state, or are they expensive programs that do
not achieve these goals. To the extent that state governments can allocate the funds to
alternative means (like child care centers) that may also achieve the same desired impact on
female employment, an estimate of the labor market e¤ects of state EITC programs will help
inform that choice. Finally, while the federal and some of the state EITC programs were
implemented and subsequently expanded at a time of strong female labor force participation
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growth, many of these state and local government programs implemented in the last decade
coincide with a period of generally at female participation rates. If these EITC programs are
found to have failed to a¤ect female participation, this would suggest that future increases
in the federal EITC may well fail to lead any more women to the labor force either. Our
results indicate that the EITC expansion increased the labor supply among single women,
but has no substantial impact on the labor market outcomes of married women. Further, we
show that the EITC expansions were most e¤ective in a time period when the benet levels
were low, indicating the state and local government EITC expansions to be less e¤ective
compared to the federal EITC expansions.
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2.0 THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNET ON MUSIC SALES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, digital technologies have permeated the recording industry where
music has been encoded in digital form and stored on CDs. Such digital technologies gained
popularity due to their quality and ease of transportation. However, the music industry has
been experiencing rapid changes over the last few years. The Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) reports that there has been a decline in CD sales since 1999, with the
highest being a 20.5 percent fall in 2007 compared to the previous year. This huge decrease
in the sale of CDs, which is the most popular format, is a cause of alarm for the music
industry1. This downward trend in the revenue from the sale of CDs is evident from the
increasing number of music CD stores that went out of business in recent years across the
United States2.
Internet piracy and illegal MP3 downloads have often been blamed for the ongoing down-
turn in CD sales (Liebowitz, 2003; Zentner, 2003). Previous studies have analyzed the e¤ect
of le sharing on record sales with somewhat conicting results. Zentner (2003), Peitz and
Waelbroeck (2004) and Liebowitz (2005) nd a negative e¤ect of le-sharing on music sales.
On the other hand, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Boorstin (2004) nd no evidence
of such detrimental e¤ects of internet piracy on music sales. Liebowitz (2003) also analyzes
alternative reasons which could a¤ect the record sale such as price of CD and change in
taste, but concludes that these reasons cannot explain the observed reduction in sales.
1Sales of CDs account for more than 85 percent of the dollar value of the total music sold (RIAA).
2According to the research group Almighty Institute of Music Retail, about 2,700 record stores went out
of business across the country since 2003.
5
The e¤ect of the internet on record sales is not just limited to online piracy and peer-to-
peer le-sharing, however. According to the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI) and Nielsen SoundScan, consumers are downloading more than ever from
authorized music-download sites in the recent years. The research rm Ipsos-Insight reports
in their quarterly digital music behavior that in late June 2003, one out of six (roughly
equivalent to ten million people) of U.S. music downloaders aged 12 and older had paid to
download music online.
In the past, bandwidth restrictions have limited the distribution of music in digital form
over the internet. However, these restrictions are disappearing due to advances in networking
(broadband) technologies. Consumers are now able to download and play high-quality music
in digital form directly through the internet at a price considerably less than what they would
otherwise pay for a CD. According to sales gures from IFPIA, the sales of digital music
has been rising due to legal downloading, for example, in 2005 it nearly tripled over 2004
levels, but were not enough to help the music industry see overall growth. As bandwidth
increases and better compression techniques are being available, the internet is becoming a
major distribution channel of music in the digital form.
The availability of internet services is not the same across the di¤erent states, however.
Prior to 2005, all cable companies and other companies interested in o¤ering cable services to
consumers, were required to negotiate separate agreements with each city before they could
lay cable in the ground or place cable along utility poles. In some states these agreements
were valid for up to as long as 15 years. In order to establish these agreements, the company
needed to enter into negotiations with as many as 2,500 or more cities per state. In recent
years, in order to streamline the video franchising process, some states have passed Video
Franchise Laws (VFL), which permit state issued agreements. Under the law, cable providers
are not required to obtain any other separate franchise agreements. According to the pro-
ponents of this law, these policies should bolster innovation, spur broadband investment,
increase competition and result in lower prices and better quality of service3. The adoption
3TIA Advocates Video Franchise Legislation Reform at September 14th Press Brieng, by Alan J Weiss-
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of a VFL acts as a source of variation across states in the availability of the internet.
Di¤erences in state housing characteristics and the historical patterns of adoption of
household appliances also play a crucial role in determining how internet adoption is di¤using
across states. Internet penetration di¤ers across states to a considerable degree, and the
adoption of household appliances as well as housing characteristics gives a plausible source
of variation, with internet availability being lesser in states with a lower household appliances
adoption rate than in ones with a higher rate. Referring to the states with lower household
appliances adoption rates as being more rural, we can say that internet availability is lower
in the more ruralstates as compared to the urbanized states. These sets of instruments
for state internet penetration rates are used by Betsey Stevenson (2006).
The arrival of digital technology has changed the way people relate to music. The rise
in portable MP3 player ownership among U.S. downloaders, coupled with the growth in
paid downloading suggests that digital music enthusiasts may be shifting their overall mu-
sic acquisition and listening behaviors from a physical to a digital approach (Kleinschmit,
About.Com). It is interesting to analyze the extent to which this new method of music
distribution is driving the decline in the old format, by looking at the progressive disappear-
ance of the traditional CD stores. The focus of the music industry so far has been on how
legal downloads has failed to ll the revenue gap created by the shortfall in traditional CD
sales. What deserves further examination, however, is whether legal downloads are actually
causing that shortfall.
Theoretically, the downloaded product can be a complement for music in regular formats
(such as a CD) as well. People might download some tracks from the internet and decide
to purchase the CD. So the actual e¤ect of downloading on the sale of music is an empirical
question. In this paper, I look at the impact of downloads on the number of traditional
CD store closings, using Current Population Survey (CPS) Computer and Internet Use
berger. To date, nineteen states have passed Video Franchise Laws. Texas was the rst state to adopt a
VFL in 2005. This was followed by California, Indiana, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina
and Virginia in 2006. Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio and
Wisconsin passed a VFL in 2007.Tennessee was the only state to implement VFL in 2008.
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Supplements data for internet availability and CD store closings data from the research
group Almighty Institute of Music Retail. In particular, I analyze whether an increase
in the availability of broadband internet service, which allows for faster access to music
downloads and may thus reduce the demand for physical CDs, has a¤ected the number of
CD store closings in a given region over a period of time4. However, establishing a causal
e¤ect is di¢ cult due to the fact that a positive association between internet penetration and
store closings may just reect the fact that people switch to music downloads whenever CD
stores nearby go out of business, thereby raising the demand for faster network connections.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) will not, in general, provide consistent estimates of the causal
e¤ect of downloading on store closings. In order to control for reverse causality and other
potential endogeneity concerns, I use information on the passage of VFLs as a source of
exogenous variation in broadband internet access. This overcomes the potential endogeneity
problem since it directly a¤ects downloading, as people in these states have greater access
to internet connections, but is does not a¤ect the outcome variable of interest. Employing
an instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy by using the VFLs as an instrument for
state internet penetration rates, I nd that an increase in internet availability is associated
with 14.5 more music store closings in a state, which explains 58.7 percent of the observed
music store closings in states that adopted VFLs. Examining the CD stores going out of
business gives us an estimate of the impact of the internet on music CD sale, as well as an
idea about its detrimental e¤ect on employment. Each traditional CD store is a source of
employment for many local workers, who might be forced into unemployment due to the
subsequent closing down of these stores5.
As a second set of instruments, I use the variation across states in the household appli-
ances adoption rate to instrument for state internet penetration rates. As a communication
technology, it is not unusual that internet penetration closely mirrors that of the telephone.
4Music CD stores represented over 50.8 percent of total music sales in 1998 and this was reduced to 31.1
percent by 2007. This is a signicant reduction in the share of sales by the music stores and the e¤ect of
increased internet access on an increase in the number of music stores closures might explain some of the
observed reduction in sales.
5According to a news article in Rolling Stones, more than 5,000 record-company employees have been
laid o¤ since 2000.
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Using the 1960 Census data for the percentage of people in each state having telephone
connection interacted with year e¤ects to instrument for online access (Stevenson 2006), I
nd that an increase in internet availability by 10 percentage points increase on average, the
number of music stores that go out of business by four, which is lesser compared to that
predicted by using the VFL to instrument for state internet penetration rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature.
Section 2.3 develops the estimation framework. Section 2.4 describes the data and reports
the main empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE
A growing literature analyzes the impact of online le-sharing on music CD sales. The
leading study to date is Liebowitz (2003), who looks at a 30-year time series of sales in
the US record industry using numbers by the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of
America) until 2002. He explains the annual trend in national record sales using a wide
variety of factors including the macro-economy, demographics, changes in recording format
and listening equipment, prices of albums and other entertainment substitutes, and changes
in music distribution. He concludes that none of these factors can fully explain the decline
in recent sales and hence it is le sharing that has reduced aggregate sales. Peitz and
Waelbroeck (2003) provides cross-country evidence in support of the claim of losses due to
internet piracy incurred by the music industry. Their results suggest that internet piracy
played a signicant role in the decline of CD sales in 2001, but was not substantial to account
for the subsequent drop in 2002.
Using a panel of weekly album sales and information on the weekly number of downloads
by album for the US, Oberholzer and Strumpf (2004) nd that music downloading has an
e¤ect on sales that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. They use two identication
strategies: across albums variation and within-album variation across weeks. To establish
causality, they employ track length, network congestion and international school holidays
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as instruments. This approach has some problems, however. The rst obstacle is that
CDs are durable goods and hence, if substitution or displacement occurs, it need not occur
necessarily within one week. If an individual decides to download instead of purchase, his
decision may very well be reected in his future purchasing behavior; hence the absence
of contemporaneous substitution does not rule out substitution more generally. Also, the
variation in a particular albums popularity over time would tend to induce a spurious
positive relationship between purchases and downloads.
Hui and Png (2003), use international panel data for 199498 to estimate that each ad-
ditional download reduces sales by 6.6 percentage points. However, the time period they
study predates the growth of broadband and widespread le sharing. Zentner (2003) uses
international time-series aggregate data, in conjunction with internet connectedness, to doc-
ument that places with more internet connections have experienced sharper reductions in
album sales. The instrument he uses is a measure of internet sophistication across coun-
tries. A possible problem with this instrument is that, it is a choice variable, hence jointly
endogenous with the interest in downloading music. Zentner mentions in his paper that a
better instrument would be to use variation in internet availability at the regional level6. In
this paper, I use exogenous variation in internet availability at the state level, since internet
adoption across states closely followed that of VFLs and the household appliance adoption
rate in the early years of 1960s.
Another group of researchers use phone surveys or internet panels to determine if indi-
viduals who download also purchase fewer music albums7. A general di¢ culty with these
studies is that they do not consider the appropriate causal relationship. People might turn
to purchasing faster network connections to download music just because there are fewer
albums available for purchase due to local music stores closing down. An additional problem
is the accuracy and the population sample of the data. Those who agree to have their inter-
6Zentner could not use this instrument, since he did not have information on internet availability at the
within country regional level for the di¤erent countries in his dataset.
7These are mostly industry studies which have reached mixed conclusions about the e¤ect of le sharing.
The studies include Pew Internet Project (2000), Forrester (2002), IFPI (2002), Ipsos-Reid (2002), Jupiter
Media Metrix (2002), Edison Media Research (2003), Neilsen//NetRatings (2003).
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net behavior discussed or monitored are unlikely to be representative of all internet users8.
In the CPS Computer and Internet Use supplements data, I overcome this sample selection
problem by exploiting di¤erences in the internet penetration at the state levels, as opposed
to individual downloading behavior.
A third approach is to see how geographic variability in correlates of downloading, such
as the availability of high-bandwidth internet access, inuences record sales. The rst study
in this respect was Fine (2000), which was a legal battle against Napster. The plainti¤ hired
Soundscan, a company that developed an information system to capture point-of-sale data
on music sales in more than 18,000 stores throughout the US. In the report, Fine compared
sales means for the rst quarter of years 1997, 1998, 1999 (when Napster was not available)
and 2000 (when Napster was available), of all stores, within one mile of any college or
university. He found that from the rst quarter of 1999 to the rst quarter of 2000, while
national sales grew 6.6 percent, sales near all universities dropped 2.6 percent, sales near
most wired schools dropped 6.2 percent and sales near schools where Napster was banned
after the rst quarter of 2000 fell 8.1 percent. However, as pointed out by Fader (2000),
sales near universities were falling since 1998, at a time when Napster was not available and
in which national sales were growing, casting doubts on the conclusion of Fines report. In
this paper I use plausible sources of exogenous variation in internet availability across states,
namely the implementation of the VFL, as well as the household appliances adoption rate
from 1960.
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
Internet access became widely available to residential users by the middle of 1990s. For
the rst few years, a dial-up connection was the primary mechanism to access the internet,
8It is likely that individuals incorrectly self-report their downloading in phone data, especially since
downloading is considered illegal. Another problem is, these internet surveys depend on individuals who
willingly agree to have all of their internet behavior monitored, and such individuals are not likely to be
representative of those who engage in illegal behavior.
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in which, a standard telephone line is used for connecting to the internet. However, the
implementation and availability of the internet has undergone a major change in the last
few years. Adoption of high-speed internet at home grew twice as fast in 2005 than in the
same time frame in 2004 (Joint Center, 2005). A signicant part of the increase is tied
to internet newcomers who have bypassed dial-up connections and gone straight to high-
speed connections. Figure 1 shows the trend in internet access at home, with broadband
connection experiencing a steady increase since June 2000. With computers now almost as
common in American homes as cable television service, the internet continues to expand
in importance as a form of communication, information, entertainment, and as the most
important source for downloading music. Home broadband adoption in rural areas, (31
percent), continues to lag high speed adoption in urban centers and suburbs. Many states
realize that the availability of broadband facilities is an important factor for economic growth
and social welfare and there are some common actions taken by state governors to adopt
strategies to facilitate broadband access. Adoption of statewide VFL is one such measure,
which inuences the deployment of broadband service since companies build infrastructure
to simultaneously provide both video and broadband services (Windhausen, 2008).
Figure 1: Trends in home internet access 2000 to 2008
Concurrently, a trend in the downturn of music sales has been observed globally over the
last few years (Zentner, 2006). Music stores have been shrinking as a source of sales and are
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mainly being replaced by online retail9. There has been a huge decline in the revenue from
the sale of CDs since the year 2000 (see Figure 2). This downward trend in the sale from
CD continues in spite of its real price falling by 9 percent over the last ten years (RIAA Year
End Report, 2007).
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Figure 2: CD sales revenue gures 1995 to 2007
One of the most important factors which explains the fall is a huge increase in music
downloading in the recent years. An associated rise in the access to the internet makes
downloading faster and easier. Figure 3 provides visual evidence of the positive relationship
between the VFL adoption and state internet penetration rates. The tted line slopes
upward, indicating that implementation of VFL by states coincides with higher internet
access in these states.
In order to estimate the e¤ect of state internet penetration on the music store closings,
the following regression equation is used:
Cs;t = + Is;t +X 0s;t + s + t + "s;t (1)
9According to the 2007 Consumer Prole Report of RIAA, the share of sales in music specialty stores
declined from 50.8 percent in 1998 to 31.1 percent in 2007. At around the same time, digital downloads
increased from 6 percent in 2005 to 12 percent in 2007.
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Figure 3: First-Stage:VFL states and the Internet penetration rates in 2007
For each state s at year t, the dependent variable Cs;t is the total number of store closings.
X 0s;t is a vector of covariates including demographic characteristics such as mean education,
age and household income of state s in year t. Since high-speed internet adoption has
been concentrated among the young, educated and higher income group, the substitution of
downloads for physical sale of music CDs and hence for store closings might be higher among
the young, educated and higher-income, and thus be correlated with those demographic
characteristics. X 0s;t also includes the proportion of white and female in state s in year t. s
and t represent the state-of-residence main e¤ects and the year main e¤ects respectively;
"s;t is a disturbance term and the variable Is;t captures the state internet penetration rates,
which is the key regressor of interest. The parameter of interest in this regression is , the
sign of which determines the impact of downloading on CD store closings. However, the
potential endogeneity concern between internet penetration rates and store closing makes it
di¢ cult to isolate the causal impact of downloading on CD store closings. One potential
source of exogenous variation in the access to internet comes from the di¤erent rates at
which it has di¤used across states. In order to establish causality, I use the VFLs as a source
of exogenous variation in broadband internet access. The causal relationship of interest is
captured by the following reduced-form regression equation:
Cs;t = + V FLs;t +X 0s;t + s + t + "s;t (2)
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where V FLs;t is a dummy variable taking a value of one for each state s that adopted
the law in year t.
In an alternative specication of equation (2), and following the approach in Stevenson
(2006), I use the rurality of a state as a determinant of state internet penetration rates, as
predicted by the adoption of telephone by households in the 1960 Census to compare with
the results obtained from using VFLs as an instrument.
Cs;t = + phones;t=1960 +X 0s;t + s + t + "s;t (3)
Here phones;t=1960 is the percentage of people in state s who had a phone connection in
the 1960 Census interacted with the year e¤ects, which acts as an instrument for the state
internet penetration rates. In addition to the set of controls mentioned above, X 0s;t contains
an additional set of covariates, the percentage of people in a state living on plots of land
between one and ten acres in the 1960 Census interacted with the year e¤ects. Since states
with more people on large acres of land have lesser internet access, it is important to control
for this state housing characteristic, otherwise the phone measures might overestimate the
impact of downloading on store closures.
In another alternate specication, I control for the presence of big-box megastores like
Wal-Mart and Best Buy, which are important competitors of CD stores apart from the down-
loading of music. Failing to control for the presence of these megastores might overestimate
the impact of downloading on the CD store closings to the extent there might be correlation
between states having above-average internet penetration and states having above-average
presence of these big box retailers. In this case I estimate the following regression equation:
Cs;t = + V FLs;t +X 0s;t + Megastoress;t + s + t + "s;t (4)
Megastoress;t denoting the number of big-box megastores in state s in year t. The results
from the OLS and reduced-form estimation are reported in the next section.
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2.3.1 Exogeneity of the Video Franchise Laws
In this section I address some of the potential concerns with my identication strategy.
My estimation strategy is valid as long as we assume that the VFL adoption inuenced
store closings exclusively through internet penetration and not through some other channel.
However, there could be other sources of bias, for example, a possibility that the states
adopting VFLs might be the ones where the local governments are o¤ering tax breaks or
changing the zoning laws in order to bring big-box retailers or sports arenas which might
serve as live concert venues to their area, which in turn might accelerate the demise of the
independent music stores. On the other hand, there might be the possibility that states
which enacted the VFLs are also passing small business subsidy programs or any other form
of aid which could help music stores survive in the face of erce competition from high speed
internet access. Hence an important question to address here is, whether the adoption of the
VFL could be endogenous. Of particular concern here is that some state characteristics like
business friendliness or the state unemployment rates could be driving the VFL adoption
and hence potentially biasing the results. In order to probe into the possible factors that
might have driven the adoption of VFL, I estimate a probit model to calculate a predicted
probability of adoption of the law based on the predictors10. In particular, I use the state
business tax climate rankings reported annually by the Tax foundation as an indicator of
the business friendliness of the states11. I also considered the per capita state gross domestic
products, state unemployment rates and mean household income of a state as other possible
factors which might have inuenced the VFL adoption.
10Table 34 in the appendix conrms that similar results hold even when we assume a linear model.
11The raw correlation coe¢ cient indicates a positive association between VFL adoption and business
friendliness (though the correlation coe¢ cient is only about 0.08). A particular concern is whether VFL
adopting states are becoming less business friendly over time. I found that in contrary, these states are
becoming increasingly business friendly over time (this is also true for the years before VFL adoption)
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The results from the probit estimation are reported in Table 33 in the appendix12. The
results indicate that as the state business ranking increases (a higher rank means the state
is less conducive to businesses), there is no statistically signicant change in the likelihood
of VFL adoption. A similar e¤ect is estimated when the role of per capita state gross
domestic product and mean household income are assessed on the adoption of VFL. However,
the state unemployment rates appear to have increased the likelihood of VFL adoption13.
In particular, an increase in state unemployment rate leads to a higher probability that
the state passes a VFL. Since a VFL adoption increases investment in broadband which
encourages economic growth, promotes businesses and results in increased job opportunities,
it is not surprising that states with higher unemployment rates have taken an initiative in
adopting the law. These state characteristics being possible factors driving VFL adoption
could potentially lead to biasing the results if they happen to inuence the store closures as
well (my outcome variable of interest in the main regression). I discuss about the existence
and any possible directions of these biases in the main results section.
One of the other concerns might be that the increased availability of the internet access
due to the adoption of VFLs are o¤ering some alternate forms of entertainment (other
than downloading music) which people in these states might turn to as a substitute for
downloading music. One such potential alternative could be to download movies. However,
it should be kept in mind that downloading movies takes a much longer time compared to
song tracks over the internet, which might suggest it is not a suitable substitute. The evidence
from recent literature regarding the possible impact of substitutes such as movie viewership
and DVD sales by Leibowitz (2003), suggests that these other forms of entertainment cannot
explain the decrease in the sale of CDs, hence we can not conclude that people have switched
to other sources of entertainment as a result of the faster internet access.
Finally, we need to recognize the possibility of other unobservable state-year specic
shocks that might be correlated with the introduction of the VFLs. In particular, if consumer
12Table 35 in the appendix conrms that similar results hold even when we assume a linear model.
13I found no evidence of the age composition or the racial mix of the population being factors driving the
VFL adoption.
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preference is shifting away from music CDs towards MP3s faster in the states which adopted
VFL compared to the Non-VFL adopting states, this could be a possible explanation for
the increased number of music stores going out of business in the VFL states. Although
it is very di¢ cult to fully account for this kind of a taste-shifter, I include covariates for
the demographic characteristics of the population of the states which might be able to
approximate any changes in underlying consumer tastes. Also, as pointed out by Leibowitz
(2003), a change in the taste for music cannot explain the recent downturn in the sale of
music CDs14. Hence, while it is impossible to fully disprove such unobservable state-year
shocks being correlated with VFL adoption, I am condent that, given the inclusion of
demographic controls that might proxy for such state-year shifts (together with the ndings
in the literature regarding the nature of such changes in internet tastes and how they could
not explain trends in CD sales), such concerns can be largely ruled out in my analysis.
14In particular, he used the nancial success of concerts as a measure of the market valuation of music and
found that there had been an increase in the real value of the concern revenues, which rules out the concern
of a dissatisfaction with the state of music. Recent gures from RIAA indicate that revenue from concert
sales has gone up from 1.6 percent in 2004 to 3 percent in 2008.
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2.4 DATA AND MAIN RESULTS
2.4.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Data on the total number of music store closings for a given state and year are obtained
from Almighty Institute of Music Retail for the years 2003 to 2008. Almighty Institute of
Music Retail is an industry research group that collects data to keep up a comprehensive
retail database, in order to better facilitate communications between record labels and music
retail, mainly for marketing purposes. Almighty Institute maintains detailed records of all
the music stores in each state in the U.S. that went out of business since 2003. They claim
to have assembled a comprehensive directory of every US prerecorded music outlet, based
on the type of store15.
The data on state internet penetration rates are obtained from the Current Population
Survey Computer and Internet Use Supplements. The October 1997, December 1998, August
2000, September 2001, October 2003 and October 2007 CPS Computer and Internet Use
Supplements ask respondents about their householdscomputer and internet use. This is in
addition to the usual survey questions on employment, demographics, geographic location
and educational attainment of each individual surveyed. The information on the adoption
of VFLs by di¤erent states are obtained from Save Access16 and Miller & Van Eaton17.
Data on variation in household appliances adoption rate across states is obtained from the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the U.S. Census of Population for
1960, one-percent sample.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the overall sample, as well as among the states
which adopted VFL and the states which did not implement VFL for the period of 1997-
15The various categories into which each store is divided are: Independent Stores, Chain Stores, Big-box
retailers, Online/Mailorder Retailers, One Stops, Mass Merchants or Lifestyle/Nontraditional retailers with
music sections.
16The primary work of Save Access is to track legislative issues and news articles around PEG and Local
Video Franchising in order to serve the PEG community (http://saveaccess.org).
17Miller & Van Eaton is a law rm o¤ering specialized services in communications law. It covers a wide
range of issues that relate to every communications industry: cable television, broadcasting, telephony, and
wireless communications (http://www.millervaneaton.com/).
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1998, 2000-2001, 2003 and 2007. There are some di¤erences to be noted from these summary
statistics. The average number of CD stores that went out of business (the outcome variable)
were higher in the states that adopted VFL (12 stores) compared to the ones which did not
(4 stores)18. The state internet penetration rates were higher by 0.5 percentage point in
states which passed the VFL compared to the rest of the states. Table 1 also summarizes
other covariates used in the analysis. The proportion of married, fraction of female in
the total population, and other demographics are very similar across the VFL and Non-
VFL states. Also, there is very little di¤erence in the average educational attainment of the
residents between these two types of states. The VFL states have a higher median household
income on average compared to the states which did not adopt the VFL. These descriptive
statistics suggests that the di¤erence in the number of CD store closures between the two
groups of states might be explained by the increase in the internet access associated with the
implementation of VFL. In a later part of this section, I turn to the regression analysis in
order to control for state and year e¤ects in addition to a set of covariates explained above.
The summary statistics for the music store closings for the years 2003 through 2007 are
reported in Table 2. Both the total and average number of store closings were highest in
2006, with the state of California having the largest number (116).
Figure 4 shows the total number of store closings in each of the years 2003 through 2008.
We can see that the number of music stores that went out of business increased sharply
between 2003 and 2004, then declined somewhat in 2005, and there were a substantially
higher number of stores closures between 2005 and 2007.
Figure 5 shows the states which adopted VFL separately for each of the years 2005
through 2007, and Figure 6 depicts the total number of music store closings for each state
in 200719
18Considering only the year 2007 (when all of the 18 states had enforced VFL), the di¤erence in the
number of storeclosings between the states adopting VFL (19 stores) and states which did not (6 stores) are
even higher.
19The rst, second and third quartiles of the total store closures are the criteria for this division.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Overall VFL States Non-VFL
States
Stores Closed 7.29
(1.20)
12.37
(2.57)
4.27
(0.87)
Internet Penetration 43.76
(1.06)
43.97
(1.67)
43.49
(1.35)
Married 55.91
(0.28)
56.37
(0.22)
55.71
(0.42)
Female 0.51
(0.0004)
0.51
(0.001)
0.51
(0.001)
White 0.83
(0.006)
0.82
(0.006)
0.84
(0.01)
Black 0.12
(0.07)
0.14
(0.006)
0.104
(0.009)
Hispanic 0.08
(0.005)
0.09
(0.009)
0 .07
(0.006)
Less than HS 23.21
(1.05)
23.75
(1.69)
23.05
(1.33)
College degree 14.17
(0.36)
14.09
(0.57)
14.12
(0.46)
Income 49577.03
(513.04)
51104.82
(719.1525)
48426.82
(679.022)
State unemployment 4.54
(0.07)
4.52
(0.09)
4.56
(0.09)
Fraction of States 0.38 0.62
Observations 294 114 186
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The internet penetration data are from CPS Computer Use and Supplements
for the years 1997-1998, 2000-2001, 2003 and 2007. The store closings data are from Almighty Research for the years
2003 and 2007. The figures reported for the number of stores closed pertain to the years' 2003 through 2007, since these
are the years for which the store closings data are available.
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Store closures
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Average number of Store
closings
3.22
(0.56)
12.10
(1.98)
7.41
(1.36)
16.35
(2.74)
11.37
(2.19)
Median number of Store
closings
2
(MO)
7
(OR)
3
(RI)
12
(AZ)
5
(WI)
Minimum number of Store
closings
0
(AR, MD,
NH, ID, ME,
MT, NV, ND,
RI, VT, WY)
0
(WY)
0
(DC, AL, DE,
ID, ME, NH,
SD, VT, WY)
0
(DE, WV)
0
(MT, RI, VT,
WV)
Maximum number of Store
closings
14
(CA, MI)
70
(CA)
40
(CA)
116
(CA)
86
(CA)
Total number of
Store closings
160 593 363 801 557
No. of observations 49 49 49 49 49
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The abbreviations for the states pertain to the State Fips Code classified by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The store closings data are from Almighty Research for the years 2003 through 2007.
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Figure 4: Total number of Store closures from 2003 through 2008
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics among the rural and urban states, as dened
by the household telephone adoption rate in the 1960 Census. The summary statistics show
that internet penetration rates are 46 percent in the more urbanized states compared to
39 percent in the rural states. These states are classied as urban or rural based on the
percentage of people in each state having a phone connection in the 1960 Census dataset20.
There is very little di¤erence in the demographic characteristics and educational attainment
between the residents of urban and rural states. The median household income is higher for
the urban states, while the state unemployment rate is lower.
As alternative outcome variables, I use the di¤erent categories of stores that went out of
business in my sample, to see whether internet availability a¤ected one type of stores more
than another, or whether there might have been a substitution among the di¤erent types of
stores. Tables 27 and 28 in the appendix report the descriptive statistics for the types of
store closings and those between the VFL and non-VFL states as well as the rural and urban
states respectively. Next we turn to the regression analysis and discussion of the estimates.
20Since around 70 percent of the households on average had a phone connection in the 1960 Census, if the
percentage of people in a particular state having a telephone is less than 70 percent, it is classied as a rural
state.
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Adopted VFL in 2007
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Figure 5: States which adopted VFL in 2005, 2006 and 2007
2.4.2 OLS Estimates
The relationship of interest is captured by equation (1), where variable Is;t is the regressor
of interest. I estimate various specications of equation (1) for store closures and the results
are shown in Table 4.
Specications 1 and 2 reports results which includes the state of residence main e¤ects as
well as year main e¤ects, whereas specications 3 and 4 shows result without considering the
state-xed e¤ects. Specication 1 shows results from models where the standard errors are
adjusted to cluster at the state level (reported in parentheis) and when standard errors are
adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation (reported in brack-
ets). In specication 2, a heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-sectional correlation
is assumed. The coe¢ cient on Is;t has the expected sign in all the specications, although it
is statistically signicant only when I assume heteroskadastic error structure with no cross-
sectional correlation, both with and without considering the state-xed e¤ects, as reported
in columns 2 and 4 of table 4 respectively. The results indicate that if state internet pen-
etration rates increase by ten percentage points on average, ten additional music stores go
out of business in a given state for a given year. The OLS results imply that, for the average
observed increase in internet penetration rates between years 2003 and 2007 in VFL states,
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Figure 6: Map of the states with store closings in 2007
we would expect to see an increase in music store closings by ten. The OLS estimation
controls for all of the observed covariates discussed in the section on research design and
identication strategy.
Using the di¤erent categories of store as alternative outcome variables, the results re-
ported in table 29 in the appendix indicate that an increase in internet availability di¤er-
entially a¤ected store closures based on the type of store. The estimates suggest that there
were more independent stores closing down compared to chain stores or the big box retailers.
In fact, there seems to be a substitution across the di¤erent types of store closures, i.e., an
increase in independent store closings and a decrease in big-box and chain store closings
As argued above, the OLS results must be interpreted with some caution because the
internet penetration rate is likely to be endogenous, with the most prominent source of bias
being a simultaneity between a strong taste for music and acquisition of internet connections.
Alternatively, it might be true that people switch to downloading music and thus increasing
the demand for faster internet connections whenever local music stores go out of business.
Given these potential sources of bias, I turn to an IV approach.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Rural versus Urban States
Overall Urban States Rural States
Stores Closed 7.29
(1.20)
8.06
(1.706)
6.14
(1.5)
Internet Penetration 43.76
(1.06)
46.16
(1.35)
39.67
(1.71)
Married 55.91
(0.28)
56.50
(0.25)
56.36
(0.22)
Female 0.51
(0.0004)
0.50
(0.001)
0.51
(0.001)
White 0.83
(0.006)
0.87
(0.01)
0.79
(0.01)
Black 0.12
(0.07)
0.07
(0.004)
0.16
(0.01)
Hispanic 0.08
(0.005)
0.07
(0.004)
0.09
(0.01)
Less than HS 23.21
(1.05)
21.11
(1.31)
27.09
(1.83)
College degree 14.17
(0.36)
15.02
(0.48)
12.46
(0.54)
Income 49577.03
(513.04)
52367.39
(621.07)
44541.2
(692.28)
State unemployment 4.54
(0.07)
4.30
(0.08)
4.83
(0.09)
Fraction of States 0.63 0.36
Observations 294 102 186
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The states are classified as urban or rural depending on the percentage
of people in each state having a telephone connection in the 1960 Census. The internet penetration data are from CPS
Computer Use and Supplements for the years 1997-1998, 2000-2001, 2003 and 2007. The store closings data are from
Almighty Research for the years 2003 and 2007.
Table 4: OLS Estimates of the E¤ect of State Internet Penetration Rates on Store closures
Store closures
(1)
Store closures
(2)
Store closures
 (3)
Store closures
 (4)
Internet penetration
rates
1.267
[1.166]
(1.656)
1.025***
(0.291)
0.984
[0.687]
(0.741)
1.047***
(0.279)
Controls for state
fixed effects? Yes Yes No No
Observations 98 98 98 98
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation. Standard errors
in parenthesis are robust. The Internet penetration data are from CPS Computer Use and Supplements and the store closings
data are from Almighty Research for the years 2003 and 2007. ***denotes significance at the 1% level. All the regressions are
weighted by population and include year-fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the
proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. Columns (3) and (4) reports results for regressions without
including the state-fixed effects.
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2.4.3 Reduced-form Estimation and Main Results
In order to estimate the parameter  in equation (1) consistently, we require a variable which
is correlated with Is;t but not with the error term "s;t. As discussed above, I instrument the
endogenous regressor Is;t with V FLs;t, the dummy variable indicating the adoption of a
Video Franchise Law. The rst-stage regression model is specied as follows:
Is;t = + V FLs;t +X
0
s;t + s + t + "s;t (5)
A positive relationship is depicted in Figure 7, which plots the internet penetration
rates (ipr) against the VFL dummy for the year 2007 (when all of the eighteen states had
implemented the law).
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Figure 7: First-Stage:VFL states and the Internet penetration rates in 2007
A positive relationship is depicted in Figure 5, which plots the internet penetration
rates (ipr) against the VFL dummy for the year 2007 (when all of the eighteen states had
implemented the law). Table 5 reports the estimates from the rst-stage regression. In all
the specications (depending on the assumptions on the error structure as explained above),
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Table 5: First Stage Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on State Internet Penetration
Rates
Internet
penetration rates
(1)
Internet
penetration rates
 (2)
Internet
penetration rates
 (3)
Internet
penetration rates
 (4)
VFL 0.735
[0.650]
(0.702)
1.013***
(0.456)
1.269
[0.932]
(0.969)
1.740***
(0.581)
Controls for state
fixed effects? Yes Yes No No
Observations 294 294 294 294
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation. Standard errors
in parenthesis are robust. The Internet penetration data are from CPS Computer Use and Supplements for the years 1997, 1998,
2000, 2001, 2003 and 2007. ***denotes significance at the 1% level. All the regressions are weighted by population and
include year-fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the proportion of female, white, black
and Hispanic for each state-year. Columns (3) and (4) reports results for regressions without including the state-fixed effects.
we nd a sizeable and positive relationship between Is;t and the corresponding instrumental
variable V FLs;t. For example, the entry in the second column of Table 5 indicates that
adoption of VFL by state s in year t is associated with a 10 percentage point increase in
the internet penetration rate. The t-statistics for the signicance of the estimated coe¢ cient
on the instrument is 2.99 when feasible generalized least squares is employed to allow for
heteroskadasticity across states, without including the state-xed e¤ects (column 4 in Table
5). The reason for a weak rst-stage might be the lack of su¢ cient data for the period in
which most of the states implemented the VFL21..
Using the phone measures as an instrument for state internet penetration rates, as ex-
plained in section 2.4.3, we obtain positive and statistically signicant relationship between
Is;t and the corresponding instrumental variable phones;t. Figure 8 shows the state inter-
net penetration rates in 2003 plotted against the predicted internet penetration using state
ownership rates of telephones in 1960.
21Data for state internet penetration rates are not available for 2005 and 2006, when about 11 states
adopted VFL.
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Figure 8: Internet Penetration predicted by 1960 phone ownership rates
The gure clearly demonstrates the huge predictive power of the historical patterns of
adoption of telephone for internet penetration across states. It strongly suggests that the
internet is di¤using to households in a way that is very similar to the pattern of other
household innovations, in particular that of telephone. The relationship depicted in Figure
8 exists for all the years of data. But an useful instrument for state internet penetration
rate should have a time-varying component, since the internet di¤usion across the states is
not uniform over the years. For this purpose, I use the 1960s phone measures interacted
with year e¤ects to instrument for internet access across the states. The rst stage of this
regression is shown in Table 6. In our preferred specication (column 1 in Table 6), where
robust standard errors are clustered at the state level, a 10 percentage points increase in
ownership of telephone is associated with a 2.5 percentage points increase in the internet
availability (for the year 2001). The F-statistics associated with the estimated coe¢ cients
on the instruments indicate a strong rst-stage.
Figure 9 shows the average number of store closures between the states which adopted
VFL and the states which did not. The states which implemented the VFL saw a higher
increase in the number of stores that went out of business, owing to the increase in internet
access that is associated with the adoption of the law.
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Table 6: First Stage Estimates of the E¤ect of phone measures on State Internet Penetration
Rates
Internet
penetration rates
(1)
Internet
penetration rates
(2)
Internet
penetration rates
(3)
Phone*Year=1997 0 .008
(0.069)
0 .008
(0.08)
-0.018
(0.058)
Phone*Year=1998 0.167***
(0.068)
0.167***
  (0.072)
0.126***
(0.059)
Phone*Year=2000 0.246***
(0.073)
0.246***
(0.075)
0.211***
(0.056)
Phone*Year=2001 0.251***
(0.056)
0.251*
(0.071)
0.209***
(0.056)
Phone*Year=2003 0.224***
(0.065)
0.224*
(0.072)
0.172***
(0.057)
Phone*Year=2007 0.134**
(0.068)
  0.134**
(0.077)
0.068
(0.060)
Controls for state
fixed effects?
Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 14.97 11.09 Chi2= 120.59
Observations 294 294 294
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The Internet penetration data are from CPS Computer Use and Supplements for the
years 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2007. *denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level.
All the regressions are weighted by population and include year fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean
education, age, and the proportion of female, white, black , Hispanic and percentage of people living on large acres of land for
each state-year.
29
05
10
15
20
25
30
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f s
to
re
cl
os
ur
es
 p
er
 y
ea
r
Storeclosures in VFL states
Storeclosures in Non-VFL states
Figure 9: Total number of Store closures from 2003 through 2007
Figure 10 shows visual evidence of the reduced-form relationship between the store clo-
sures and the instrument. The tted line has a positive slope, indicating that the adoption
of VFL coincides with a higher number of music stores going out of business.
The reduced-form estimates of equation (2) represents the main results which are shown
in Table 7. The ndings are consistent with the existence of a positive statistically and
economically signicant causal impact of VFL adoption on store closures. When we adjust
the standard errors for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation (Table 7
column 1), the reduced-form estimate implies that adopting VFL causes on an average, 14
more store closures in a state for a given year. This indicates that an increase in internet
availability, through the adoption of VFL by the states, explains 58.7 percent of the total
store closings in those states. The model also explains 15.8 percent of all store closures in
the US22
The estimation results for equation (3) are reported in Table 8. The coe¢ cients on
phones;t have the expected sign in all three specications. However, the ndings are generally
22Note that the specications do not control for the presence of Megastores. The results including the
presence of Megastores as control are reported in table 10.
30
0
50
10
0
15
0
st
or
ec
lo
si
ng
s/
Fi
tte
d 
va
lu
es
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
VFL
storeclosings Fitted values
Figure 10: Reduced-form:store closings and VFL adoption by states
consistent with a positive and statistically signicant causal impact only when a feasible
generalized least squares method is employed to allow for heteroskadaticity23. These results
indicate that a 10 percentage points increase in phone ownership is associated with 4 more
store closings in a state for a given year (result for 2006, column 3 in Table 8). Hence the
reduced-form approach yields results that are broadly consistent with the OLS results, thus
providing supporting evidence for their ndings.
The two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimates of equation (2) represents the IV results
which are reported in table 9. Here the state internet penetration rates are instrumented
by the VFL dummy. These results indicate an economically signicant positive causal re-
lationship between the states adopting the VFL and store closures. However, because of
the sparsity of data, the results are not statistically signicant at any common levels of
condence. The IV results suggest that state internet penetration rate is mediating the rela-
tionship between VFL and store closings that we nd in the reduced form estimation. Using
the adoption of telephones in the 1960 Census as an instrument for internet penetration, the
2SLS estimates in table 26 in the appendix indicate a similar relationship between phone
23Homoskadasticity may be a restrictive assumption for panels, where the cross-sectional unit, in this case
the states may be of varying size and as a result may exhibit di¤erent variation.
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Table 7: Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures
Store closures
(1)
Store closures
 (2)
Store closures
 (3)
Store closures
 (4)
VFL 14.471***
[6.571]
(9.017)
8.344***
( 1.739)
19.435***
[7.058]
(8.550)
13.347***
(1.739)
Controls for state
fixed effects? Yes Yes No No
Controls for year
fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 245 245 245 245
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation. Standard errors
in parenthesis are robust. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years 2003 through 2007. ***denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level. All the
regressions are weighted by population and include year-fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean education, age,
and the proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. Column (2) and Column (4) reports results from
GLS estimation. Columns (3) and (4) reports results for regressions without including the state-fixed effects.
Table 8: Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of phone measures on Store closures
Store closures
(1)
Store closures
(2)
Store closures
(3)
Phone*Year=2003 0.155
(0.276)
0.155
(0.298)
0.219
(0.157)
Phone*Year=2004 0.273
(0.264)
0.273
(0.302)
0.291**
(0.159)
Phone*Year=2005 0.297
(0.289)
0.297
(0.312)
0.305**
(0.160)
Phone*Year=2006 0.347
(0.275)
0.347
(0.304)
0.381***
(0.158)
Phone*Year=2007 0.363
(0.281)
0.363
(0.331)
0.355***
(0.166)
Controls for state
fixed effects?
Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 2.52 1.62 Chi2= 24.03
Observations 245 245 245
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years
2003 through 2007. All the regressions are weighted by population and include year-fixed effects. Other
controls include population; mean education, age, the proportion of female, white, black, Hispanic and
percentage of people living on large acres of land for each state-year. *** denotes significance at the 1%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Table 9: 2SLS Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures
2SLS
(1)
2SLS
 (2)
VFL 21.823
[25.574]
(36.261)
13.229
[10.320]
(10.764)
Controls for state fixed effects?
Yes No
Observations 245 245
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation. Standard errors
in parenthesis are robust. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years 2003 and 2007. All the regressions are
weighted by population and include year-fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the proportion
of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. Column (2) reports results for regressions without including the
state-fixed effects.
connection and store closings, which supports the reduced-form results.
The reduced form results for the alternate outcome variables depending on the type of
stores is reported in table 30 in the appendix. The estimates imply that there has been
an increase in the number of independent, chain and other category of store closures and
a decrease in big-box retail stores, following the adoption of VFL. These results indicate
that the increase in internet availability through the adoption of VFLs in the states which
implemented it, have not uniformly a¤ected the di¤erent types of music store closures. There
have been more independent and chain store closures compared to the big-box retailers,
suggesting a substitution among the di¤erent categories of music stores.
In an alternate specication of the reduced-form regression equation, I controlled for
the presence of big-box megastores like Wal-Mart and Sams Club, which are the main
competitors of the music CD stores. The results from the reduced-form estimation are
reported in table 10. Adjusting the standard errors for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity
and serial correlation (Table 10 column 1), the reduced-form estimate implies that adopting
VFL causes on an average, 9 more store closures in a state for a given year.
Now I turn to a discussion about the existence of any possible sources of bias in the main
estimation regressions. From the above discussion of the exclusion restrictions we identied
state unemployment rates as a factor that might have driven the adoption of VFL. I included
this factor in my main regression. Also I included the state business rankings to see whether
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Table 10: Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures control-
ling for the presence of megastores
Store closures
(1)
Store closures
 (2)
Store closures
 (3)
Store closures
 (4)
VFL 9.276**
(6.358)
[8.184]
6.161***
(1.483)
13.330**
(8.261)
[9.626]
6.291***
(2.165)
Megastores 0.508***
(0.193)
[0.168]
0.377
(0.099)
0.084
(0.021)
[0.028]
0.109
(0.013)
Controls for state
fixed effects? Yes Yes No No
Observations 245 245 245 245
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation. Standard errors
in parenthesis are robust. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years 2003 through 2007. ***denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level. All the
regressions are weighted by population. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the proportion of female,
white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. Columns (3) and (4) reports results for regressions without including the state-
fixed effects.
this leads to any potential bias. Including this index is important, since it might be that stores
in states which are more business friendly face lower costs, thereby being less likely to incur
losses and thus more liekly to stay in business longer; or perhaps being more business friendly
means that the companies will have a faster turnover and that will accelerate the demise of
the CD stores. So theoretically, the impact of the business friendliness of a state on store
closures (and hence the sign of the possible bias) is not clear a priori. The results reported in
table 35 in the appendix indicate that an increase in business ranking (i.e.: states becoming
less business friendly) leads to more store closures, which might lead to a potential downward
bias of the reduced form estimates. However, since business friendliness is uncorrelated to
VFL adoption, this does not a¤ect the observed relationship between the VFL regressor and
store closures24. The state unemployment rates have no statistically signicant impact on
store closures which rules out the possibility of any bias on my reduced form estimates. A
positive coe¢ cient on per capita state gdp might indicate a potential upward bias on the
reduced form estimates, but again, since per capita state GDP is uncorrelated to the VFL
24I also checked whether including these covariates one at a time changes the result; the results are very
similar to the ones reported in table 35.
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adoption, this does not a¤ect the observed relationship between the VFL regressor and store
closures25..
2.4.4 Falsication
In order to support the validity of my instrument for state internet penetration rates, in
this section I present a falsication exercise pretending that the adoption of VFL by the
states occurred in 2003 instead of in 2005, 2006 or 2007. The rst-stage regression model is
specied as before:
Is;t = + V FLs;t +X
0
s;t + s + t + "s;t (6)
with the VFL dummy taking a value of one between the years 2003 and 2004 for the
18 states which adopted the Video Franchise Law. Table 31 in the appendix reports the
estimates from the rst-stage regression of this falsication exercise. In all of the specica-
tions (depending on the assumptions on the error structure as explained above), I nd point
estimates which are small and not statistically signicant. This exercise conrms that the
positive impact of adoption of VFL on internet penetration rates in the states which adopt
the law are indeed true e¤ects.
Table 32 in the appendix shows the results for the reduced-form estimates from the fal-
sication exercise. In my preferred specication (when the standard errors are adjusted for
unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation) as well as other specications
including the state-xed e¤ects, I nd no e¤ect of the adoption of VFL on store closures in
those states. However, the estimates without including the state of residence main e¤ects
are statistically di¤erent from zero, indicating that the VFL-adopting states might be hav-
ing more store closures even before the adoption of the law. When I repeated the exercise
25It is somewhat counter intuitive that an increase in per capita state gdp (which is an indication of the
economic prosperity of a state) is causing more music CD store closings. I further checked whether di¤erent
types of stores were a¤ected di¤erently and found an increase in per capita state gdp causes an increase in
independent store closings but a reduction in big-box retailers. This is in line with the argument provided in
the discussion of exclusion restrictions that states might be bringing big-box retailers or sports arenas which
in turn might accelerate the demise of the independent music stores.
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pretending VFL was adopted two years prior to when it actually was, the results are qual-
itatively similar and are reported in panel B of table 32. In spite of not being able to rule
out a concern about an upward trend in store closures in the VFL adopting states before
the adoption, to the extent that the falsication test is satised for my main specication,
this is not a concern here.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
Internet usage has increased dramatically over the past few years. At about the same time,
the sales from music has witnessed a huge decline. In this paper, I use two sources of
exogenous variation in the internet access across US states to measure the impact of music
downloads on the progressive disappearance of the traditional music CD stores. Specically,
I use information on the passage of Video Franchise Law and the di¤erences in the household
telephone adoption rate in the 1960 Census as the two sources of variation in the availability
of the internet access across the states. The sale of CDs is a very important source of revenue
for the music industry, accounting for more than 85 percent of total music sold in the US.
The share of record stores, which represent a signicant portion of the sale from CDs saw a
decline of over 8 percent within the last three years (RIAA Consumer Prole, 2007). Hence,
it is crucial to estimate the extent to which a change in the consumer preference in the form
of downloading music is driving out the old format.
Using CPS Computer and Internet Use Supplements data for state internet penetration
rates and CD store closings data from Almighty Institute of Music Retail, I nd that the
implementation of VFL increases the availability of internet access in the states which adopt
it, and explains 58.7 percent of the total store closings in those states. Also, a 10 percentage
points increase in the phone ownership is associated with 4 more stores going out of business
in a state for a given year. The results suggest that a variability in the access to the internet
can explain the di¤erence in the music store closures across states. These empirical results
support the idea that technological progress in the household in the form of increased internet
access played an important role in the demise of the traditional music CD stores. Although
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due to data limitations I am using store closings as my outcome variable of interest, in the
event of data availability, looking at the total number of stores in a given region over a period
of time would have been a preferable outcome26.
These results have signicant implications for public policy. While the adoption of VFLs
by states have the impetus for economic growth and social welfare, there is some caution
to be exercised by state governors while implementing these policies. In addition to the
detrimental e¤ects of illegal downloading on the music sales that is well documented in the
literature, the increased availability in faster network connections now urge a rise in the legal
downloads as well. This aggravates the situation for an already struggling music industry by
driving the traditional music stores out of business and further reducing revenue from the
sale of CDs.
26To address the concern of whether there were a large number of music store openings in the states which
adopted VFL over the period of time, I did a Lexis-Nexus search of relevant newspaper artilcles. I found
there were very few store openings over this period. Specically, there were 5 openings in New York, 4 in
California, 3 in Massachussettes and 1 in Ohio.
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3.0 THE EFFECT OF PARENTAL LEAVE ON FEMALE EMPLOYMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM STATE POLICIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, parental leave policies have been an important issue of debate given
their possible impacts on employment, leave taking and earnings. In particular, since 78
percent of labor force is composed of families where both parents work (Grant et. al, 2005),
parental leave policy is a relevant topic both at the federal and state level of the government.
Research on the e¤ect of such leave policies are particularly important given the recent trends
in female employment. For instance, more than half (52 percent) of women with children
under the age of one were employed in 1998 compared to only two-fths ten years earlier
(Waldfogel, 1999).
In spite of the substantial increase in the percentage of women with young children in the
labor force, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is the only law in the United States
at the federal level to directly address family leave issues. In particular, FMLA requires
employers with 50 or more employees to allow twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave
following the birth or adoption of a child. Enacted in 1993, the legislation covers private,
state and local government employees who worked at least 1250 hours in the last 12 months.
Therefore, year 1993 is identied as the beginning of job-protected maternity leave policies
at the federal level. In addition, given that the percentage of employees under maternity
leave coverage increased dramatically after the enforcement of FMLA (86 percent in 1995 as
compared to 39 percent 1991, Waldfogel (1999a)), it is worthwhile analyzing its impact on
female employment.
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Hence after, some states1 have introduced di¤erent extensions to the FMLA which relax
the employees eligibility -such as the minimum number of hours worked and the required
number of workers in the rm- covering both public and private sector employees. Although
FMLA is the only law at the federal level which provides some assistance to new parents,
there were laws prevalent at the state level long before the federal act came into e¤ect. In
particular, the Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI), which provides wage replacement for
non-work connected sickness or injury, includes disabilities related with pregnancies. The
TDI is implemented by ve states2, which started to apply this law from 1942 to 1969. The
Paid Family Leave program, implemented by California in 2004, has been the most recent
law enacted with regard to parental leave policy. In particular, it provides partially paid
leave for a period of 6 weeks.
Hence, the above policies basically di¤er in either their medical requirements for eligibility
or the paid/unpaid leave they provide. On the one hand, TDI provides paid leave, but only
if the mothers maternity is associated with medical conditions which support a doctors
decision of considering it a temporary disability3. On the other hand, FMLA provides
unpaid leave but it does not require the consideration of maternity as a temporary disability.
Finally, Californias Paid Family Leave program can be considered as the most generous of
these programs since it provides a paid leave (as TDI) and, in addition, it does not require
the temporary disability consideration (as FMLA).
This paper analyzes the impact of the existing parental leave policies on female employ-
ment. That is, do these di¤erent policies have the same impact on female employment? In
particular, we examine whether the introduction of FMLA di¤erently a¤ected female em-
ployment in those states having some paid parental leave policy before FMLA was enacted
those which previously implemented the TDIand those states which did not have any
1Connecticut, Maine, Oregon and Vermont are the states whose FMLA expansion covers both the public
as well as private sector employees. There are seven other states plus District of Columbia which also
expanded FMLA but does not cover both public and private sector employees.
2California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island. Puerto Rico also has TDI law.
3After the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, every pregnancy is treated as a temporary disability.
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kind of paid parental leave policy those which neither passed TDI nor any other form of
state maternity leave policy4. Additionally, we examine if change in the female employment
was higher in those states which expanded the benets (and relaxed the eligibility criteria)
of FMLA than in those which did not. Finally, we analyze whether Californias Paid Family
Leave program has a di¤erential impact on female employment compared to (1) states that
did not expand FMLA, and (2) states which expanded FMLA. The answer to these questions
provides some interesting policy recommendations about parental leave programs.
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of FMLA on female employment, coverage,
leave-taking and earnings. One of the most relevant works in this respect is Waldfogel
(1999a). She used March CPS data for the years 1992-1995 to compare the change in female
employment, coverage, earnings and leave-taking between states which had no job-protected
maternity leave legislations before FMLA (39 states) to the 11 states and DC that had
prior job-protected parental leave laws. Essentially, her analysis grouped together a set of
12 states, each of which had a di¤erent state maternity leave policy and hence are likely to
have di¤erent impacts on female employment. Also, some of the states that she considered as
having no job-protected maternity leave legislations before FMLA (among the 39 states), had
some form of maternity leave policy prevalent before FMLA was passed in 1993. Hence there
was variation within her no protection states in the actual amount of protection that women
in these states were granted before FMLA was passed. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-
di¤erences estimation strategy, her results indicate that there has been an increase in coverage
and leave-taking following the enforcement of FMLA, whereas there has been no change in
employment. Given that eligible women in some of the experimental states actually received
treatment, this would have the e¤ect of biasing the estimates towards zero.
The di¤erence between our work and the former paper is twofold. First, we identify
those ve states that had some form of paid parental leave policy before FMLA was enacted,
i.e. those states which previously implemented TDI. This specic classication allows us to
4There were eighteen states which had no maternity leave policy before the implementation of FMLA.
They are, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming.
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work with a homogeneous group of states which have been a¤ected by the same law, and
it captures the uniform di¤erential impact of FMLA on female employment between those
states applying TDI and those applying no state parental leave policies5. Second, we go one
step beyond the analysis of FMLA and additionally compare whether the impact of FMLA
on female employment di¤ers between those states which expanded its benets and relaxed
its eligibility criteria and those which did not expand them, which Waldfogel (1999a) did not
analyze. This enables us to study whether the impact on female employment and labor force
participation is di¤erent when certain states make the parental leave policy more generous.
In contrast to the previous results, we nd a positive and statistically signicant impact of
FMLA on female employment in the states which had no law prior to FMLA compared to
the states which had TDI6.
Another important contribution to the literature is Kallaman (1996). She studies the
e¤ect of the FMLA on female employment and wages. Her results show a positive (negative)
and signicant e¤ect of FMLA on employment (wages). Kallamans work does not make any
distinction between the e¤ects of FMLA and those of other policies. On the contrary, our
paper focuses on comparing the relative performance of the above federal and state policies
on female employment and labor force participation which greatly enriches the analysis.
More recently, Ho¤erth and Curtin (2006) studied how implementation of the FMLA a¤ected
mothersreturn to the work place and their changes in wages. However, as mentioned before,
our paper is mainly focused on the e¤ect of maternity leave policies on female employment
across di¤erent states.
We use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DD) and di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DDD)
estimation strategy, where the rst di¤erence is between the states which received the treat-
ment (states that had TDI) and the states which did not. The second source of di¤erence
has to do with the time of the treatment, i.e.: before and after 1993, when FMLA was
5Note that California, New Jersey and Rhode Island had some maternity leave legislations before FMLA
was enacted, so the di¤erential e¤ect on female employment cannot be attributed to TDI alone for these
three states.
6Using the same states as the experimental and non-experimental groups considered by Waldfogel, we
replicate her results, i.e.:obtain no statistically signicant impact of FMLA on female employment.
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passed. The third di¤erence is between the treated group and the control group, which did
not receive the treatment. Some of the results obtained in this paper are the following. First,
the impact of FMLA in those states which did not previously enact TDI is signicantly more
positive on female employment than the impact of this law in those states which already
had TDI. The increase in female employment and labor force participation in those states
that most generously expanded the benets and eligibility criteria of FMLA is signicantly
higher than in those that did not. Finally, the introduction of Californias Paid Family Leave
program in 2004 has not yet provoked changes in female employment which can be consid-
ered signicantly di¤erent from those in states applying either the FMLA or the expanded
FMLA alone.
As mentioned above, the e¤ects of FMLA on employment have been shown to be positive
(but small) by both theoretical and empirical literature; see Klerman and Leibowitz (1994),
Ruhm (1997) and Waldfogel (1996). This paper, then, goes in the line of this literature,
but provides a much richer analysis and comparison about the e¤ects of FMLA on female
employment in states with and without previously enacted TDI, examines the labor market
e¤ects of the FMLA expansions implemented by di¤erent states, and nally provides a com-
parison about the impact of the most recent and generous parental leave policy in California
with respect to those policies currently applied in the rest of the country.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we develop an overview of the parental
leave laws in United States. Section 3.3 explains the theoretical e¤ects of mandated leave
policies on female employment. Section 3.4 lays out the research design and methodology.
Section 3.5 describes the data used in the analysis. In sections 3.6 through 3.9 we present
our results to the main questions analyzed above, and provide some intuition. Section 3.10
concludes and suggests further research in the analysis of parental leave policies at the federal
and state level.
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3.2 OVERVIEW OF PARENTAL LEAVE LAWS
Parental leave policy has undergone many changes during the last decades. Figure 11 il-
lustrates the evolution of maternity leave laws in US. The rst state to introduce a paid
maternity leave through TDI was Rhode Island in 1942, followed by California (1946), New
Jersey (1948), New York (1949) and Hawaii (1969). TDI is o¤ered to all workers in these
states by state mandate. The program provides temporary income to workers with non-
work related short-term disabilities, including pregnancy and childbirth. It is funded by
either employee or employer or both, and ranges in coverage from 6 to 52 weeks7
1993
1942
TDI
First state:
Rhode Island
FMLA
2004
California’s Paid
family Leave
Program
1969
TDI
Last state:
Hawaii
States which have expanded or Complemented FMLA
1978
PDA
Figure 11: Parental leave laws: 1942-2004
In particular, TDI can be understood as a form of paid maternity leave, since disability
insurance policies provide paid leave at state level and benets for disability related to
pregnancy and childbirth to ensure the same treatment as other medical disabilities. The
TDI coverage for the rst few weeks after a birth is routine, since all mothers are considered
medically disabled for a certain period of time after child-birth. A study by the University
of Rhode Island (2005) suggests that about 62 percent of TDI claimants were women, and
the most explanatory variable to account for such high number of women ling claims was
TDI coverage for childbirth (Employment Bulletin, RI Department of Labor and Training).
The Family and Medical Leave Act (enacted in 1993) is the only law in terms of parental
leave policy at the federal level. The legislation covers private, state and local government
employees. However, the coverage under the Family and Medical Leave Act is not universal.
7See table 41 in the appendix for a detailed explanation about weekly benet amounts and duration of
the TDI program.
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FMLA guarantees parents unpaid, job-protected leave of up to 12 weeks following the birth
or adoption of a child, but only if they meet certain qualifying conditions. First, they must
work for a rm with 50 or more employees, which means only about 60 percent of workers in
the private-sector are covered (Han and Waldfogel, 2003). Second, they must have worked
at least 1,250 hours in the past year for their employers, which reduces the share of workers
covered to 46 percent (Cantor et al, 2001).
Over the years a considerable number of states have relaxed as well as complemented
the requirements of FMLA. This paper considers four states for whose FMLA expansion not
only a¤ected public but also private sector workers8and have made the FMLAmore generous.
In particular, the state of Connecticut expanded FMLA in 1997 applying it to employees
who worked 1000 hours for at least 12 months prior to a request for a leave, and eligible
employees are entitled 16 workweeks of leave (instead of only 12). In 1997, Maine extended
the applicability of its family medical leave laws by lowering the requirements for employee
eligibility to 15 employees. Oregon (1996) made FMLA more generous by applying it to
employers with 25 or more employees, and established that those workers who are employed
for 180 days or more are eligible for 12 weeks of leave within a 12 month period. Finally,
similar to Oregon, Vermont (1998) reduced the number of minimum employees to 10, who
should have worked for one year on an average of 30 hours a week to be eligible for 12
weeks of leave during any 12 month period. In addition, all of these four states allowed the
possibility of substituting accrued paid leave for maternity leave purposes (see table 42 of
appendix for details about the extensions of FMLA).
Finally, one of the most recent parental leave policy to be enacted is Californias Paid
Family Leave (PFL) program, which came into e¤ect in July 2004. California is the rst state
in the country to create a comprehensive paid family leave program. It provides workers with
paid leave during a period of six weeks, covering approximately 55 percent of their pre-taxed
weekly wage, up to a maximum of $840, while on leave. This insurance program is fully
funded by the employees. The new mothers in California are now eligible for Paid Family
8There are eight other states which expanded the FMLA benets, but they did not cover both private and
private sector employees. In addition, the relaxations in eligibility and expansions in benets were minimal.
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Leave benets in addition to the TDI benets. While FMLA o¤ers 12 weeks of unpaid leave
for those working for employers with 50 or more employees, Paid Family Leave program
guarantees that 6 of those weeks would be paid.
3.3 THEORY
The theory on mandated benets suggest that they preserve the employersability to tailor
arrangements to their workers and to o¤er more than minimum packages. In terms of their
allocational e¤ects on employment, mandated benets represent a tax at a rate equal to the
di¤erence between the employers cost of providing the benet and the employees valuation
of it (Summers, 1989). In other words, it is assumed that workers and rms will voluntarily
agree to the provision of family leave if the expected benets exceed the associated costs.
Parental leave benets could also increase occupational segregation, by increasing the rel-
ative cost of employing women in certain types of jobs, and lead to higher unemployment
for the groups who are most likely to use it. (Ruhm and Teague, 1997). However, there are
a considerable number of economic arguments that have been made favoring leave entitle-
ments usually focus on retaining rm-specic human capital or decreasing unemployment by
reducing the need for women to change jobs, if they wish to spend time at home with young
children. (Trzcinski, 1991).
According to the theory (Ruhm, 1997), a mandated leave raises labor costs and so shifts
the labor demand curve to the left (from D1 to D2 in Figure 12). Since employees receive
benet from the leave entitlement, the supply curve simultaneously shifts to the right (from
S1 to S2). Hence the equilibrium wages fall while employment may either increase or decrease,
depending on the relative size of the shifts. Figure 12 illustrates the case where the expenses
to employers exceed the benets to the employees, and employment decreases (from E1 to
E2). However, there could be additional dynamic e¤ects. For instance, labor productivity
would rise if parental leave increases rm-specic human capital by allowing individuals to
return to their old jobs. This causes the demand curve to shift to the right (from D2 to D3
in Figure 2), increasing employment and decreasing the wage reduction or actually leading
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to a rise in earnings. The proponents of leave mandates frequently use this reasoning to
anticipate increases in both wages and employment for the groups who are most likely to
use parental leave.
S1
S2
D1
D3
D2
E2 E1 E3 Employment
W2
W1
W3
Wage
Figure 12: Theoretical predictions of mandated leave policies
The theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction regarding the e¤ects of parental
leave programs on employment. On one hand, it predicts that the cost associated with the
leave might be borne by women as a group, in the form of lower employment (as employers
might shift away from hiring women), or in the form of lower wages (when employers pass on
the cost of benets to women). On the other hand, it also predicts that these e¤ects might
be o¤set by an increase in the labor force attachment of individual women.
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.4.1 Identication Strategy
The research design is based on the study developed by Waldfogel (1999a). In the rst
part of our analysis, the eighteen states which did not have parental leave policy prior to
FMLA those states neither applying TDI nor any other form of state parental leave policy
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constitute the experimental states. The ve states which did have TDI prior to FMLA are the
non-experimental states. For the second part of the study, the four states which expanded
or complemented FMLA are considered as the experimental states for each particular case,
with the non-experimental states being the states applying only FMLA. Finally, the state of
California (experimental state) is compared with those states which only have FMLA or have
expanded it (non-experimental states). We could use DD analysis to compare the change
in outcomes for the experimental states to the change in outcome for the non-experimental
states. However, this approach may produce biased estimate if there were other di¤erences
between these two groups of states that a¤ected both the passage of state laws and the change
in their outcome variables over time (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). To overcome this
problem, we use a DDD methodology.
We study the impact of state parental leave policies on the employment of women. Since
we use a DDD estimation strategy, this requires identifying one or more treatment groups
(the groups who are a¤ected by the passage of a law) and one or more control groups (those
who are not a¤ected by the law but are otherwise a¤ected by the same underlying factors, so
that their behavior can be used to approximate how the treatment group would have acted
in the absence of the policy). The di¤erent parental leave policies that we are analyzing
are expected to primarily benet women of childbearing ages, therefore, we use women aged
19 to 45 with children older than one year old, or women in the same age group who are
childless as our treatment group. In addition, we consider an alternative treatment group in
our analysis, which is composed of women aged 19 to 45 with children under the age of one.
These groups of women are included in the treatment group because they are eligible and
more likely to obtain the benets of parental leave policies. Also, we focus on these women
because they are the potential beneciaries of the law and might bear some of the costs of
the law (in terms of employers passing along the costs of these benets to those potentially
benetting from it). In order to isolate the impact of the parental leave policies from other
factors (like economic shocks or other policy changes) that a¤ect labor market outcomes,
we use control groups. Ideally, a control group should be similar in characteristics to the
treatment group, and hence likely to respond in the same way to a given policy change,except
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for the fact that it does not receive the treatment. For this purpose, we use women aged
46 to 60 as the control group, since they may plausibly substitute for women under 45 in
employment but are more likely to have reached the end of their reproductive lives and
hence less likely to take advantage of parental leave laws. However, comparison between
younger females and older females might not be su¢ cient to identify the e¤ect of parental
leave policies. These older women have their own labor market trends which di¤er from that
of the younger women, and there could be some age-specic factors that might make their
preferences towards work di¤erent from that of younger females. For this purpose (and as
is customary in the literature)9, we use men between the age of 19 and 45 as an alternative
control group. Men of the same age as women in the treatment group, while also potential
substitutes in employment, are less likely to have been a¤ected by changes in tastes for work
as older women. However, men have their own work preferences and might face di¤erent
labor market prospects compared to women (mainly due to gender discrimination in the
workplace). Since each of the control groups we use are plausible but imperfect comparisons
for the treatment group, we use both types of workers alternatively as control groups in order
to better identify the e¤ects of parental leave policies on female employment10.
Our estimates of the e¤ects of the federal parental leave policy on female employment is
the di¤erence between the change in female employment after the introduction of the FMLA
in those states which previously applied TDI and those which did not. Another estimate of
this e¤ect is obtained from the di¤erence in the change of the female employment between
those states which expanded FMLA and those which did not. Finally, the estimate of the
e¤ect of the state parental leave policies on female employment measures the di¤erence
between the change in the female employment in California after the enactment of the Paid
Family Leave programand that in the states which expanded FMLA and those which did
not.
9See Baker and Milligan (2008), Rodgers and Zveglich (2003)
10Also, since our analysis closely follows that of Waldfogel (1999a) who used men as alternate control
group, in order to replicate as well as compare our results to this study, we include this group.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics
Variable Treatment Alternative
Treatment
Control Alternative
Control
Age 32.28 (0.00) 28.16 (0.01) 51.96 (0.01) 31.80 (0.01)
College
Graduate
0.44 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) 0.35 (0.001) 0.46 (0.00)
High School
Drop Out
0.17 (0.00) 0.18 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00) 0.17 (0.00)
Employed 0.74 (0.00) 0.58 (0.00) 0.66 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00)
Fraction in
States with no
Law
0.56 (0.00) 0.57 (0.00) 0.55 (0.00) 0.56 (0.00)
Observations 1,210,503 164,265 618,343 1,269,131
Notes: Treatment refers to the women aged 19 to 45 with children older than one year old or childless
women; Alternative Treatment refers to women aged 19 to 45 with children under the age of one. Control
refers to women aged 46 to 60 and Alternative Control refers to men aged 19 to 45. Data are from IPUMS-
CPS for the years 1979-2007.
3.5 DATA
We use IPUMS-CPS data from 1979-2007, which is an integrated set of data from the March
Current Population Survey (CPS). In the second part of our study, which analyzes the
e¤ects of the FMLA expansions, we also use data from CPS where time period depends on
the particular year in which the state expanded FMLA. Finally, the analysis of California
uses data from the 2001-2007 CPS.
Table 11 presents the summary statistics for the period 1979-2007 (mean and standard
error) of the characteristics of the treatment and control groups. Column 1 shows the
characteristics of women in their childbearing age with their youngest child above the age of
one or women without children. Column 2 contains women between 19-45 whose youngest
child is less than one year. Column 3 shows women aged between 46-60 and column 4 shows
the summary statistics of men aged between 19-45.
There are some di¤erences to be noted from the summary statistics. Women with children
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above the age of one or without children (column 1) have, on average, the same age as
men (32 years), whereas women in alternative treatment group are on average younger
than men (the alternative control group). The percentage of employed in the treatment
group is lower (74 versus 91 percent) than the alternative control group, and the percentage
employed for the alternative treatment group is even lesser. Both treatment and alternative
treatment group women on average are more educated than women aged between 46-60
(control group). Notice that, the percentage of women and men in the eighteen states
which had no law prior to FMLA is fairly constant, so we can be certain that any of the
results are not driven by compositional changes. The summary statistics indicate that any
di¤erences in the labor force participation among the groups are not driven by di¤erences in
the demographic characteristics of those groups. The only di¤erence between the treatment
(and alternative treatment) and control (and alternative control) groups are that the former
have been a¤ected by changes in parental leave laws whereas the latter have not been a¤ected
by such changes.
Table 12 presents the summary statistics for the case of California (2001-2007). Column
1 shows the treatment group, column 2 the alternative treatment group, while columns 3
and 4 show the control and the alternative control group, respectively.
Some di¤erences can also be pointed out from the above table. Women with children
above the age of one or without children (column 1) have, on average, the same age as
men (33 years), whereas women in alternative treatment group are younger (30 years);
treatment group works less than the alternative control group (73 versus 89 percent), whereas
alternative treatment group are less likely to be employed compared to both control groups.
Both the treatment and alternative treatment group women are similarly educated compared
to women and men in the control groups.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics: California
Variable Treatment Alternative
treatment
Control Alt. Control
Age 32.95 (0.05) 30.45 (0.11) 51.49 (0.04) 32.51 (0.05)
College
Graduate
0.56 (0.00) 0.53 (0.01) 0.57 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00)
High School
Drop Out
0.18 (0.00) 0.22 (0.01) 0.19 (0.00) 0.20 (0.00)
Employed 0.73 (0.00) 0.55 (0.01) 0.71 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00)
Fraction in
States with no
Law
0.61 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00)
Observations 21,733 2,880 112,45 23,236
Notes: Treatment refers to the women aged 19 to 45 with children older than one year old or childless
women; Alternative Treatment refers to women aged 19 to 45 with children under the age of one. Control
refers to women aged 46 to 60 and Alternative Control refers to men aged 19 to 45. Data are from IPUMS-
CPS for the years 2001-2007.
3.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR FEMALE EMPLOYMENT
The likely direction of the e¤ects of maternity leave policies on female employment is not
clear apriori. On the one hand, if women are more inclined to take leave and return to their
previous jobs, then we expect to nd a positive e¤ect on employment. On the other hand,
if employers pass on the costs of mandated benets to those potentially benetting from it
(women of childbearing age), then we might observe a decrease in employment. Further, if
these two e¤ects o¤set each other, we might nd no impact on employment at all. Therefore,
the direction of the e¤ect of maternity leave policies on female employment is an empirical
question. This section, given the above research design, estimates the following equation
Yilt = 0+1t+ 2NSl+3TGi+4NSlTGi+0POST t+1NSlPOST t
+2TGiPOST t+3NSlTGiPOST t (7)
where i indexes the individual, l the state and t the year. The outcome variable of interest,
Yilt; is a dummy equal to one if a woman worked for at least one week during the previous
year, and zero otherwise. NSl is a dummy equal to one if the lth state has no state parental
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leave policy before 1993, and zero if the state had TDI. TGi is a dummy taking a value
one if individual i belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise. Finally, POSTt is a
year dummy taking value one after FMLA was enacted (i.e. after 1993) and zero otherwise.
Since FMLA was enacted in 1993, we conduct our analysis pre and post 1993, in order to
capture the impact of the law on female employment. We dene employment as working for
a positive number of weeks during the year. In alternate specications, we use labor force
participation rate as the outcome variable, where it is dened as participation in the labor
force during the preceding week.
3.7 ANALYSIS OF FMLA IN STATES WITH AND WITHOUT TDI
Table 13 reports the di¤erential impact of FMLA on female employment between states that
had no law prior to FMLA and states which had TDI before FMLA. Column (3) shows the
di¤erence between the change in female employment for experimental states those with no
previous lawsand non-experimental states those with TDI, before and after 1993. Column
(4) represents the change of female employment between the treatment and control group,
i.e. DDD. Finally, DDD adjusted 1 controls for marital status i.e. dummy variable married
takes a value of one if the individual is married and zero otherwise, DDD adjusted 2 includes
a time trend since the data contains more pre than post years, and DDD adjusted 3 controls
for both marital status and time trend. Notice that the Treatment group represents women
aged 19-45 with their youngest child above age one or childless women, while control group
are women aged 46-60 years and alternative control group are men aged 19-45 years.
In order to analyze the possibility of a di¤erent impact of FMLA depending on the
womans educational attainment, we di¤erentiate our sample by education levels. In partic-
ular, the dummy variable Educi is one when individual i has less than 12 years of schooling,
and zero otherwise. We divide our sample into two groups, one represents high school
dropouts and the second group contains the individuals who have a high school degree, a
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Table 13: The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law and states with
TDI before FMLA
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD.
adj1
DDD.
adj2
DDD.
adj3
Treat Pre'93 0.790 0.740
Pos'93 0.720 0.660 0.016
Control Pre'93 0.630 0.630
Obs.675,816 Pos'93 0.740 0.720 0.020 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
standard
errors
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Alt. Control Pre'93 0.920 0.900
Obs.963,726 Pos'93 0.920 0.890 0.012 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***
standard
errors
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
marital
status?
no yes no yes
linear time
trend?
no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre '93 period consists of the years 1978 - 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported. ***
denotes statistically significant at one-percent level.
college degree or are college dropouts. In this case, equation 7 can be rewritten as,
Yilt = 0+1tl + 2NSl+3TGi+4NSlTGi+0POST t+1NSlPOST t+2TGiPOST t
+3NSlTGiPOST t + 5Educ+ 6NSlEduci+7TGiEduci+8NSlTGiEduci
+4POST tEduci+5NSlPOST tEduci+6TGiPOST tEduci
+7NSlTGiPOST tEduci (8)
The results obtained from both equations (with and without the dummy variable Educ)
are shown in tables 13 and 14. In addition, the same analysis is conducted for labor force
participation, where Yilt is a dummy equal to one if a woman participated in the labor force
during the preceding week and zero otherwise (tables 15 and 16 contain the results obtained
for labor force participation)
According to the PDA in 1978, the TDI should treat every pregnancy as a temporary
disability. Hence the coverage of the TDI extended to cover pregnancy as mandatory after
the passage of the PDA. In order to analyze the possibility of a di¤erential impact of FMLA
on female employment and labor force participation rates, we restrict the sample for the
pre-FMLA period from 1978 through 1992.
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Table 14: The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law and states with
TDI before FMLA, by education groups
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD.
adj1
DDD.
adj2
DDD.
adj3
Treat Pre'93 0.910 0.860
Pos'93 0.880 0.810 0.017
Control Pre'93 0.770 0.780
Obs.675,816 Pos'93 0.840 0.810 0.031 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015
F-statistic (3.76) (4.92) (3.96) (5.12)
Alt. Control Pre'93 0.810 0.800
Obs.963,726 Pos'93 0.790 0.780 0.001 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.007***
F-statistic (12.11) (12.66) (12.08) (12.65)
marital
status?
no yes no yes
linear time
trend?
no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre '93 period consists of the years 1978- 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported. ***
denotes statistically significant at one-percent level.
3.7.1 Analysis of the results
Table 13 suggests that when the treatment group is compared to the control group as ob-
served in column 4, the introduction of FMLA has an e¤ect on female employment which is
indistinguishable from zero. However, when the treatment group is compared to the alterna-
tive control group, i.e. men, the DDD estimates are positive and signicant. This suggests
female employment increased in states which had no law compared to the TDI states after
the implementation of FMLA, when women in their childbearing ages are compared to men.
When we further analyze by the educational attainment, table 14 shows signicant DDD
estimates for high-school dropout women, when the employment of female are compared to
men.
We further check whether the high educated women (having more than a high school
degree) are di¤erentially a¤ected by the implementation of FMLA. The results indicate
(tables not reported) that there is a no impact of FMLA on the employment of higher
educated women in the states which had no law compared to the TDI states, when women in
childbearing ages are compared to men. Also, the estimates are statistically indistinguishable
from zero when these women are compared to the control group, i.e. older women.
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One reason for the insignicant results for the comparison between treatment group and
control group that is older women could be explained by the fact that the paper considers a
long period of time and hence on average the e¤ects are obscured although there might be a
di¤erent impact for some of the years compared to others. However, repeating the analysis
by separately taking each of the years after 1993 did not change the results.
A possible explanation for the results can be obtained from the literature analyzing
the theoretical predictions of mandated leave policies (Ruhm, 1997). In particular, this
literature suggests that, after the introduction of maternity leave policies, labor demand
shifts downwards, decreasing employment level. However, as womens awareness of the policy
increases, we should expect a downward shift in the labor supply curve, raising employment
level as a consequence. Nonetheless, in the long run, women are more likely to return to
their original jobs (reducing the employer adjustment costs) and work more hours to be
eligible for the benets. The former e¤ects may increase the employers labor demand due
to the higher productivity levels of female employees shifting it upwards, what is referred
by the literature as the dynamic e¤ect of mandated leave policies. In this context, our results
reect that the dynamic e¤ect of FMLA is slightly positive and signicant for women in their
childbearing ages (when compared to men).
Regarding our results with respect to labor force participation, table 15 shows that
the DDD estimates are positive and signicant when we compare treatment group to the
alternative control group. Hence, the change in female labor force participation after the
FMLA was enacted (between experimental and non-experimental states) was signicantly
higher for those women potentially beneting from the law (in the treatment group) than for
men (in the alternative group). Therefore, the change in female labor force participation after
the implementation of the FMLA was higher for women in states which had no maternity
leave laws prior to FMLA compared to women in states which have TDI
Table 16 analyzes the possibility of a di¤erent impact of FMLA, depending on the
womans educational attainment. Indeed, we also observe a positive and signicant DDD
estimates for high-school dropout women, when the employment of female are compared to
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Table 15: The estimates of FLFP rates between states with no law and states with TDI
before FMLA
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD.adj1 DDD.adj2 DDD.adj3
Treat Pre'93 0.745 0.706
Pos'93 0.686 0.623 0.024
Control Pre'93 0.581 0.595
Obs.675,816 Pos'93 0.712 0.699 0.026 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.004
standard
errors
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Alt. Control Pre'93 0.919 0.907
Obs.963,726 Pos'93 0.9081 0.886 0.010 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
standard
errors
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
marital
status?
no yes no yes
linear time
trend?
no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre '93 period consists of the years 1978 through 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported.
DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status, DDDadj2 reports estimates controlling for a
linear time trend and DDDadj3 reports estimates controlling for both. *** denotes statistically significant at
one-percent level.
men. There is a positive e¤ect on the female labor force participation when we analyze by
the high educated group of women. Hence, the aforementioned shift in female labor supply
can be mainly explained by a change in willingness to work for low-educated women, and
also changed incentives for higher educated women.
Table 36 in the appendix analyzes the results from a falsication exercise pretending that
FMLA was adopted in 1981 instead of the actual year 1993 of its implementation. Hence
pretending that treatment occurred several years before it actually did, I nd that none of
the estimates are statistically signicant. As reported in table 36, the DDD estimates are
positive but insignicant when we compare the treatment group both to the control group
(older women) and to the alternative control group (men). Therefore, the change in female
labor force participation after the implementation of the FMLA (pretending it was adopted
in 1981) was not statistically di¤erent for women in states which had no maternity leave
laws prior to FMLA compared to women in states which have TDI.
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Table 16: The estimates of FLFP rates between states with no law and states with TDI
before FMLA, by education groups
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD
adj1
DDD
adj2
DDD
adj3
Treat Pre'93 0.860 0.808
Pos'93 0.836 0.763 0.021
Control Pre'93 0.732 0.753
Obs.675,816 Pos'93 0.821 0.807 0.035 -0.014 -0.017 -0.015 -0.042
F-statistic (4.22) (5.64) (4.63) (4.22)
Alt. Control Pre'93 0.774 0.769
Obs.963,726 Pos'93 0.746 0.740 0.001 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021***
F-statistic (17.92) (19.09) (18.09) (17.92)
marital
status?
no yes no yes
linear time
trend?
no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre '93 period consists of the years 1978 through 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported.
DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status, DDDadj2 reports estimates controlling for a
linear time trend and DDDadj3 reports estimates controlling for both. *** denotes statistically significant at
one-percent level.
3.8 ANALYSIS OF EXTENSIONS OF FMLA
Using equation (7) we study the e¤ects of the expansions of FMLA that the aforementioned
four states introduces in their jurisdiction. The results obtained for Connecticut and Vermont
are presented in tables 37 and 38 in the appendix respectively. Specically, in this section we
report the estimates of the alternative treatment group, which is composed of women aged
19 to 45 with children under the age of one, comparing with both the control group and the
alternative control group. The results using the treatment group are very similar that of
the alternative treatment group, with the only di¤erence being that none of the results are
statistically indistinguishable from zero when we use the treatment group.
The DDD estimates are positive and statistically signicant for Oregon, (table 17). In
particular, the labor force participation rates are higher by 18.84 percentage points in Oregon
compared to states which did not expand FMLA, when we compare women with young
children to older women in the control group. The labor force participation rates for women
with young children in Oregon are higher by 11.04 percentage points when compared with
men in the same age group. This result indicates that making the FMLA more generous in
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Table 17: The estimates of FLFP rates between Oregon and states with no law before FMLA
Oregon Only
FMLA
DD DDD DDD
adj. 1
Alt. Treat Pre 96 0.417 0.592
Pos 96 0.527 0.570 0.131
Control Pre 96 0.747 0.668
Obs. 28,463 Pos 96 0.720 0.699 -0.056 0.189*** 0.188***
standard errors (0.075) (0.075)
Alt. Control Pre 96 0.909 0.913
Obs. 58,817 Pos 96 0.929 0.913 0.021 0.111* 0.105*
standard errors (0.069) (0.069)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. *** denote statistically significant at the one-percent level. *
denotes statistically significant at ten-percent level. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital
status. Pre 96 years are '93-'95. Pos 96 years are '96-'98.
terms of eligibility and leave options are encouraging more women in the childbearing age
with young infants to participate in the labor force, compared to similar women in states
which o¤er no such generosity. The results are very similar if we control for the marital
status of the individual and include a linear time trend. However, when we further divide
the sample into two groups based on their educational attainment, the di¤erence in the
employment growth of women with infants between Oregon and states that had no law
before FMLA is not signicant
The women in the childbearing age with young infants are also 17.15 percentage points
more likely to be employed in Oregon compared to similar women in states which do not
complement the FMLA (table 18) and 10.01 percentage points more likely to be employed
when compared to men. Similar to the result for labor force participation, exploring the
possibility of a di¤erential impact depending on the educational attainment, we do not nd
anything statistically indistinguishable from zero. Note that Oregon is the state o¤ering
the most generous benets and eligibility criteria in its expansion of FMLA. In particular,
this state reduced the minimum number of rm employees from 50 to 25, and the number
of days worked for the same rm to 180. Intuitively, the positive e¤ect of such generous
expansion may come from two sources. First, women may increase their willingness to work,
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Table 18: The estimates of Female Employment between Oregon and states with no law
before FMLA
Oregon Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Alt. Treat Pre 96 0.554 0.661
Pos 96 0.686 0.661 0.131
Control Pre 96 0.785 0.706
Obs. 28,463 Pos 96 0.768 0.729 -0.040 0.172*** 0.171***
standard errors (0.069) (0.069)
Alt. Control Pre 96 0.916 0.931
Obs. 58,817 Pos 96 0.949 0.931 0.031 0.100* 0.096*
standard errors (0.063) (0.063)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. *** denotes statistically significant at the one-percent level. *
denotes statistically significant at the ten-percent level. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital
status.  Pre_96 years are '93-'95. Post_96 years are '96-'98.
which shifts the female labor supply downwards. Second, a generous FMLA expansion raises
the opportunity cost from losing the job, which increases workers e¤ort and productivity,
ultimately leading to a greater employers demand for female workers.
The DDD estimates are positive and statistically signicant at the 5-percent level for
female labor force participation rates, for Maine (table 19). The female labor force partici-
pation rates are higher by 14.57 percentage points in Maine compared to states which did not
expand FMLA, when we compare women with young children to older women in the control
group. The labor force participation rates for women with young children in Maine are higher
by 13.38 percentage points when compared with men in the same age group. The results are
very similar if we control for the marital status of the individual and include a linear time
trend. However, the estimates are not statistically signicant for female employment, and
when we divide the sample into groups based on their educational attainment11
One of the reasons of not observing any signicant impact on female employment and
female labor force participation in the other two studied states might be that the expansions
are not e¤ective enough to invoke any change in the employment behavior of women in these
states. With a more relaxed eligibility criteria and greater complementarity to the FMLA,
11The results for female employment and two di¤erent educational groups are not reported.
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Table 19: The estimates of Female Labor Force Participation rates between Maine and states
with no law before FMLA
Maine Only FMLA DD DDD DDD
adj.1
Alt. Treat Pre 97 0.619 0.595
Pos 97 0.748 0.588 0.136
Control Pre 97 0.716 0.685
Obs. 27,886 Pos 97 0.724 0.703 -0.009 0.146** 0.142**
Standard errors (0.079) (0.079)
Alt. Control Pre 97 0.897 0.912
Obs.  56,213 Pos 97 0.901 0.913 0.003 0.134** 0.137**
Standard errors (0.074) (0.074)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. ** denotes statistically significant at the five-percent level.
DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre 97 years are '94-'96. Pos 97 years are '97-'99.
the states might be able to initiate an increase in female labor force participation rate as
well as in female employment. Also, the small size of the state of Vermont which leads to
very small sample sizes of all groups in this state, it is not surprising that none of the results
are signicant.
3.9 ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIAS PAID FAMILY LEAVE PROGRAM
In this subsection, we use equation (1) to examine how Californias Paid Family Leave pro-
gram has a¤ected the change in female employment and labor force participation rates.
We compare Californias Paid Family Leave program with those states applying the ex-
panded and non-expanded FMLA. Table 20 analyzes how the female labor force participa-
tion changed in California before and after the enactment of the Paid Family Leave program
in 2004. In particular, Column 3 (DD estimates) in table 20 compares the change in the
female labor force participation with respect to that in states which only had FMLA (non-
expanded), and the four states which have expanded FMLA programs. Finally, Column
4 (DDD estimates) compares the change in female labor force participation between the
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Table 20: The estimates of FLFP rates between California and states with no law before
FMLA
California Only FMLA DD DDD DDD
adj.1
Treat Pre 04 0.761 0.778
Pos 04 0.738 0.756 -0.002
Control Pre 04 0.718 0.718
Obs. 143,023 Pos 04 0.721 0.719 0.002 -0.007 -0.006
standard errors (0.013) (0.013)
Alt. Control Pre 04 0.899 0.908
Obs.193,978 Pos 04 0.889 0.899 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005
standard errors (0.008) (0.083)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status.
Pre 04 years are '01-'03. Pos 04 years are '04-'07.
treatment and control groups.
Table 21 analyzes change in female labor force participation between California and the
states which expanded FMLA, before and after the enactment of the Paid Family Leave
program in 2004. The results for the change in female employment are given in tables 39
and 40 in the appendix.
From these tables we can see that the DDD estimates are both economically and statisti-
cally insignicant. Hence the introduction of the Paid Family Leave program did not initiate
an increase in female labor force participation, when we compare them with the labor force
participation of women in states which had no law before FMLA as well as states which ex-
panded FMLA. This is true for female employment as well. The results are very similar if we
consider women with young infants (alternative treatment group) as our treatment group.
Also, when we further carry out the analysis dividing the women in the sample into two
di¤erent educational groups, the results are still statistically insignicant12. In the context
of changes in supply and demand curves as commented above, these results would suggest
that the decrease in labor demand o¤sets the increase in female labor supply in the three-
12The results for the di¤erent educational groups are not reported.
61
Table 21: The estimates of FLFP rates between California and states with which expanded
FMLA
California Exp. FMLA DD DDD DDD
adj.1
Treat Pre 04 0.816 0.795
Pos 04 0.790 0.769 -0.001
Control Pre 04 0.682 0.773
Obs. 54,838 Pos 04 0.685 0.776 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
standard errors (0.016) (0.016)
Alt. Control Pre 04 0.899 0.899
Obs. 74,235 Pos 04 0.889 0.885 0.004 -0.008 -0.008
standard errors (0.115) (0.115)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status.
Pre 04 years are '01-'03. Pos 04 years are '04-'07.
year period following the implementation of the law, and future years of data are needed
to observe whether the dynamic e¤ect on labor demand nally raises female employment.
Whenever a new policy is implemented at the state level, people are not immediately aware
of that and hence a certain period of time is required before we can observe the full e¤ects
of such a policy. It should also be noted that California is a state where women having
children can utilize the benets of TDI and FMLA. Hence it might not be possible for Paid
Family Leave program to initiate any further changes to the employment behavior of women,
especially when such a parental leave policy is fully funded by the employees themselves. A
relevant policy recommendation would be to implement such a policy where there could be
equal contributions on part of the employer in addition to that of an employee.
Another possible explanation for the insignicant results of the Paid Family Leave pro-
gram in California could be the low take-up rates. According to the statistics reported by
the Employment Development Department of California, the percentage claim of PFL ben-
ets was only 1.01% in 2005 and 1.07% in 2006. A study by Rothschild (2007) suggests
the possible reasons for the low take-up rates13. The most important of them is that a
13Jesse Rothschild and Rothschild-Landry Holding Inc.(November 2007)
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signicant portion of Californias workforce is undocumented, due to the high percentage of
immigrant population in California. Also, workers use available sick leave, vacation leave
instead of parental leave and hence no claims are led. The surveys conducted support
the lack of worker awareness of the available benets provided by the Paid Family Leave
program, which further adds to the ine¤ectiveness of such parental leave policies.
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3.10 CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the e¤ect of federal and state parental leave policies on female employ-
ment and labor force participation, analyzing the interaction of these laws when more than
one coexists in the same labor market. First, this study shows that the introduction of the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) has a signicantly positive impact on the employ-
ment of women in those states which had no state law providing parental leave benets than
in those applying the Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI). However, the estimated e¤ects
are quire small. Since the FMLA is granting unpaid leave, one implication of this result is
that the FMLA is not really a¤ecting the employment decisions of women in childbearing
ages since most of them cannot a¤ord to take leave which provides no payment. In general,
the results suggest that the benets associated with the FMLA are not enough to alter the
labor force participation decisions of women who are the potential beneciaries of the law
by a substantial amount.
Second, we nd that the impact of FMLA expansion on female employment and labor
force participation in those states with the most generous expansions (in terms of improving
the benets and relaxing the eligibility criteria of FMLA) is signicantly higher than in those
states which did not expand FMLA. In particular, the higher opportunity cost from losing
the job and its consequences on productivity may explain these interesting results.
Finally, in order to get an intuitive understanding of the e¤ects of further increases in the
generosity levels of parental leave policies, we consider the recent enactment of Californias
Paid Family Leave program. Specically, we obtain that there is no impact of the introduc-
tion of this law, which may be due to the short time period of its application. Additionally,
another explanation for the limitation of this policy (neither positive nor negative e¤ect) on
female employment and labor force participation is based on the previous adjustments in
Californias female labor market prior to the passage of this leave program, which reduces
the possibility of further changes in the labor market behavior of both female workers and
their employers. Also, the low take-up rates of the policy plays a crucial role in explaining
its lack of e¤ectiveness.
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More extensive analysis should be conducted specially in the case of California, in order
to test the hypothesis. In addition, further research can be carried out to examine the impact
of additional increases in the generosity levels of federal and state parental leave policies on
female employment and labor force participation, as well as the interaction of these policies
in the same labor market, as is suggested in this paper.
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4.0 THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF STATE AND LOCAL
EXPANSIONS OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
EITC is one of the major federal programs providing assistance to the working poor. It
encourages low-income workers with children to enter and remain in the labor market by
supplementing the earnings of those working for low wages, hence "making work pay". It
is a subsidy on labor earnings which raises the income of recipients without providing a
disincentive to work. The EITC operates as a tax credit that serves to o¤set the payroll
taxes and supplement the wages of low-income workers. The EITCs popularity relative to
means-tested cash transfers like the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
TANF programs is due, at least in part, to the perception that the EITC rewards work.
Unique among income-transfer programs for the poor, the EITC conditioned its benets on
earnings. Benets actually increased with family earnings through a portion of the income
distribution, before eventually phasing out at higher incomes. This was just the opposite
of the traditional welfare programs like AFDC and Food Stamps, which provided maximum
benets to families without earnings and then reduced benets at a very high rate as family
earnings increased. As a result, EITC was viewed not as a replacement for traditional
welfare, but as a supplement and as a potential source of cash assistance for the working
poor, a group often overlooked by most poverty programs. The growing popularity of the
federal EITC has led several states and some local governments to implement their own
programs in recent years. The individuals who qualify for the federal EITC are entitled to
receive the state supplement, which is typically a xed percentage of the federal credit. The
labor market e¤ects of the federal EITC are well known; Eissa and Leibman (1996) found
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a positive, signicant e¤ect and Meyer and Rosenbaum found that as much as 40 percent
of the increase in labor force participation of single women with children between 1980 and
2000 can be attributed to the EITC expansions. The recent literature has also studied some
of the state programs, most of which have focussed on one of the state supplements to the
federal EITC (Ho¤man, 2007;Cancian and Levinson, 2006), with somewhat contradictory
results.
In this paper, we analyze the labor market impacts of the implementation of all the state
and local governmentsEITC supplement1 using Current Population Survey data from 1984
to 2006. This is important for three reasons: it serves as a further test for the theory of labor
force participation and labor supply, and contributes to answering the question of whether
EITC payments by state governments a¤ect participation in the same way as the federal
EITC does. Given that at least one study found no signicant e¤ects of state EITCs (Cancian
and Levinson, 2006), this question seems to be unresolved at this point. Moreover, since
Cancian and Levinson looked at only one particular state EITC supplement (Wisconsin),
it is worth checking the e¤ect on labor force participation of all the states together, thus
creating additional variation. A second reason is to help access the e¤ectiveness of these state
programs, that is, whether the EITC programs are indeed an e¤ective means of boosting
labor force participation in a state, or are they expensive programs that do not achieve
these goals. To the extent that state governments can allocate the funds to alternative
means (like child care centers) that may also achieve the same desired impact, an estimate
of the labor market e¤ects of state EITC programs will help inform that choice. Hence, the
magnitudes of these e¤ects are key determinants of the gains or losses from the changes in
income redistribution. Finally, while the federal and some of the state EITC programs were
implemented and subsequently expanded at a time of strong female labor force participation
growth, many of these state programs implemented in the last decade coincide with a period
of generally at female participation rates. If these EITC programs are found to have failed
to a¤ect female participation, this would suggest that future increases in the federal EITC
may well fail to lead any more women to the labor force either. No other study has analyzed
1Till date, there are twenty-three states and the District of Columbia, and four local governments which
have implemented the EITC supplement.
67
the labor market impact of all of the state EITC programs that have been implemented till
date. Our focus here will be on married women because they are the demographic group of
workers whose behavior is most susceptible to policy changes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the eligibil-
ity criteria and the general structure of the EITC and outlines its theoretical impact on
participation and hours worked. Section 4.3 discusses the pervious literature. Section 4.4
describes the data and the identication strategy and presents the empirical results. Section
4.5 concludes.
4.2 STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL AND STATE EITC
The EITC was established in 1975 for low-income working families with children. It is the
largest cash transfer program for lower income families at the federal level. An unusual
feature of the credit is its explicit goal to use the tax system to encourage and support those
who choose to work. It is a tax credit for working families and individuals who earn less than
a specied yearly wage. The EITC provides a wage supplement that is equal to a percentage
of the earnings of the low-income individuals. The credit o¤sets the taxpayers income
tax liability or provides a refund in a situation where the family does not owe any taxes.
Since its inception, the EITC has undergone three substantial expansions, the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) and the 1993 OBRA. It
represents the largest single source of funding for low-income working families ($41.5 billion
in 2005, National Center for Children in Poverty) and has been found to produce discernible
increases in employment and reductions in welfare receipt among single parents, as well as
large decreases in poverty (Neumark and Wascher, 2000).
The EITC is refundable, meaning that the Treasury Department pays it out regardless
of whether the taxpayer has any federal income tax liability. A taxpayers eligibility for
the earned income tax credit depends on his earned income (or in some cases adjusted
gross income), and the number of qualifying children who meet certain age, relationship and
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residency tests2. First, the taxpayer must have positive earned income, dened as wage and
salary income, business self-employment income, and farm self-employment income. Also,
the taxpayer must have adjusted gross income and earned income below a specied amount
(in 2006, the maximum allowable income for a taxpayer with two or more children was
$36,348; Tax Policy Center). Second, a taxpayer must have a qualifying child, who must
be under age 19 (or 24 if a full-time student) or permanently disabled and residing with
the taxpayer for more than half the year. Prior to 1993, the EITC was only available to
families with children, and even now, the maximum credit available to families with children
is much larger than that available to childless taxpayers. In addition, households with two
or more children are able to claim a higher EITC than households with only one child,
starting in 1991. The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on the
taxpayers earned income, adjusted gross income, and the number of EITC-eligible children
in the household.
There are three regions in the EITC credit schedule. The initial phase-in region trans-
fers an amount which is equal to the subsidy rate times their earnings. In tax year 2006,
the subsidy rate of the EITC was 7.66 percent for taxpayers with no child, 34 percent for
taxpayers with one child and 40 percent for those with two or more children. In the at
region, the family receives the maximum credit ($412, $2747 and $4536, respectively in tax
year 2006), while in the phase-out region, the credit is phased out at the phase-out rate
7.66 percent for taxpayers with no child, 15.98 percent for those with one child and 21.06
percent for taxpayers with two or more children (2006). Figure 13 shows the EITC (2006)
parameters for single parent families with one child, and two or more children.
Figure 14 shows how the introduction of the EITC shifts the budget constraint of an
otherwise untaxed individual from ADE to ABCDE. With the EITC, an individual faces a
new budget constraint, where each hour chosen produces at least as much after-tax earnings
as it did before the earned income tax credit was introduced. Since the credit is not available
to a taxpayer who does not work, that is, one who has zero earnings, his well-being has not
changed. Hence any taxpayer who preferred to work before will still prefer working and some
2Since 1993, a small amount of the credit is available to taxpayers without children.
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Figure 13: Federal EITC schedule, Single Parent Family 2006
may nd that the additional after-tax income from the EITC makes it worth entering the
labor force. Therefore, the impact of the EITC on the labor force participation (extensive
margin) of taxpayers is unambiguously positive. The impact on the hours worked (intensive
margin) of a taxpayer already working, however, depends on which region of the EITC he
was in before the credit was introduced. There is a theoretically ambiguous e¤ect on labor
supply of a worker in the phase-in range. This is because, the credit increases the workerss
e¤ective wage so that the substituition e¤ect encourages additional hours while the income
e¤ect causes hours to decrease. So the relative magnitudes of the substituition and income
e¤ect determines whether hours worked increases or decreases. For a worker in the at region,
there is an unambiguous decrease in labor supply, since there is only an income e¤ect, which
reduces hours worked. In the phase-out region, the EITC again reduces labor supply, since
there is both a negative substituition e¤ect from the credit being phased out and a negative
income e¤ect from the additional income received from the credit. Beyond the credit region,
the taxpayers may have an incentive to reduce their hours of work in order to receive the
credit.
The labor market incentives of the EITC are mixed. While the program has an unam-
biguously positive theoretical e¤ect on participation, but conditional on participation the
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program has largely ambiguous e¤ects on the labor supply decisions. There are also reasons
to believe that all of these e¤ects will be a¤ected by complexities and lags in the tax code.
The tax credits for income earned in one year are not received until taxpayersle their EITC
forms the following year. Also, workerslimited understanding of the EITC may reduce their
responsiveness. For these reasons, the magnitude of the actual e¤ect of the EITC on hours
worked is an empirical question. Table 22 shows the complete federal EITC rate schedule
since 1975.
Over the years, twenty four states and a few cities and counties have adopted their
own EITC programs: Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Lousiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachussettes, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin and the District of Columbia. These are set as a supplement to the federal
EITC by o¤ering benets equal to some designated proportion of the federal payments3,
typical percentages ranging from 5 percent to 43 percent. Most of these states provide EITC
supplements which are refundable for taxpayers with zero liability4. Wisconsin is the only
state that di¤erentially a¤ects families with three or more children, by providing a more
3Minnesotas credit for families with children is not structured as a percentage of the federal credit.
Depending on income level, the credit for families with children may range from 25 percent to 45 percent of
the federal credit. Also, Indiana has an EITC that is not based on the federal credit, but applies to families
with children, where earned income exceeded 80% of total income and total income is below $12,000.
4Delaware,Iowa,Maine and Virginia provide non-refundable EITC supplements.
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Table 22: Federal EITC rate schedule 1975-2007
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Table 23: State EITC supplements (1984-2006, percentages of the federal credit)
State CO DC DE IL IN IA KS ME MD MA MN MN MI NE NJ NY OK OR RI VT VA WI WI WI
children 1+ 0 1+ 1+ 1 2 3+
1984
1985
1986 22.21
1987 23.46
1988 22.96 23
1989 22.96 25 5 25 75
1990 5 22.96 28 5 25 75
1991 6.5 10 10 27.5 28 5 25 75
1992 6.5 10 10 27.5 28 5 25 75
1993 6.5 10 10 27.5 28 5 25 75
1994 6.5 15 15 7.5 27.5 25 4.4 20.8 62.5
1995 6.5 15 15 10 27.5 25 4 16 50
1996 6.5 15 15 20 27.5 25 4 14 43
1997 6.5 10 15 15 20 5 27.5 25 4 14 43
1998 6.5 10 10 10 25 25 20 5 27 25 4 14 43
1999 8.5 6.5 10 10 10 25 33 20 5 26.5 25 4 14 43
2000 10 10 5 6.5 10 5 15 10 25 33 10 22.5 5 26 32 4 14 43
2001 10 25 5 6.5 10 5 16 15 25 33 15 25 5 25.5 32 4 14 43
2002 10 25 5 6.5 15 5 16 15 25 33 17.5 27.5 5 5 25 32 4 14 43
2003 10 25 5 6 6.5 15 4.92 20 15 25 33 20 30 5 5 25 32 4 14 43
2004 10 25 5 6 6.5 15 4.92 20 15 25 33 20 30 5 5 25 32 20 4 14 43
2005 10 25 20 5 6 6.5 15 4.92 20 15 25 33 20 30 5 5 25 32 20 4 14 43
2006 10 35 20 5 6 6.5 15 5 20 15 25 33 10 8 20 30 5 5 25 32 20 4 14 43
Refundable? Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Notes: children is left blank if the state supplement applies irrespective of the taxpayer's number of children. Maryland also had a non-
refundable EITC of 50 percent for families with children from 1987-2006.
generous state EITC supplement for these families. State EITCs are set as a supplement to
those who already qualify for the federal EITC, and the level is assigned to equal a given
percentage of the federal payment. So the e¤ective EITC rate  in a given state is such
that,  =(federal EITC rate) * (1+state EITC supplement). For example, a single parent
with one child who earned $7500 in 2007 would be in the phase-in range of income, and is
eligible for a federal EITC payment of $2550. If he lives in Rhode Island, which provides a
25 percent state EITC supplement, his e¤ective phase-in rate would be (34*1.25) and hence
would receive an additional $637.50 from the state government. Therefore, a 25 percent
EITC supplement is equivalent to a 25 percent expansion of the federal EITC for residents
of that particular state.
The details on state supplements are provided in table 23. While most of the states
introduced EITC supplements in the mid to late 1990s, a considerable number of them
implemented their state EITCs in the last few years.
The rst state to enact an EITC supplement was Rhode Island in 1986. Initially, it
o¤ered a non-refundable EITC until 2002, and henceafter a small portion is made refundable.
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There are four other states, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, and Virginia which o¤er credits that are
nonrefundable. Such a credit is available only to the extent that it o¤sets a familys income
tax. A nonrefundable EITC can provide substantial tax relief to families with state income
tax liability, but it provides no benets to working families that have income too low to owe
any income taxes. Over the years, many states have increased their credits several times
since rst passing them and some states which had non-refundable state EITC supplements
have made them refundable.
State EITCs are nanced in whole or in part from funds available in a states general fund
that is, the same funding sources that are typically used for other types of tax cuts. When
an EITC is used to o¤set the e¤ects of a regressive tax increase such as a sales tax increase,
a part of the proceeds of the revenue increase may be set aside for the EITC. Current federal
regulations also o¤er the opportunity to nance a portion of the cost of a refundable credit
from a states share of the federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block
grant, but most states have very limited availability of such funds because the value of the
TANF block grant has eroded over time and also states face costly new work requirements
under the federal budget law5. There are four local governments who have also implemented
their EITC programs in recent years. The rst was Montgomery county in Maryland, which
enacted the local EITC in 1999, set at 20 percent of the federal payment. The second local
government and rst city to pass its own EITC was Denver in 2002, a program which was
discontinued in 2004 due to insu¢ cient TANF funds. This was followed by New York City
in 2004, which enacted a refundable EITC with the tax credit set at 5 percent of the federal
credit. Finally, San Francisco launched a city-level, refundable EITC in 2005, which was
initially set at 10 percent and increased to 16 percent in 2006.
4.3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Most of the previous studies of the labor supply e¤ects of the EITC have focussed on the
three major discrete policy changes in the federal EITC as the main source of variation. Eissa
5Colorados EITC was funded by a state surplus under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR). It was
suspended in 2002 when surplus funds ran out.
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and Liebman (1996) use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to analyze the 1986 expansion
of the EITC and found that the labor force participation rates of single women with children
increased signicantly compared to childless single women, whereas they found no change
in the relative hours worked by single women with children who were already in the labor
force. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) also determines the e¤ect of EITC on the labor force
participation of single women, by considering the impact of other tax and welfare changes
like AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps and their implicit tax rates and earnings disregards, as
well as AFDC waivers instituting time limits or work requirements, with their major source
of variation being di¤erences in incentives faced by single women with and without children.
They found that the EITC played a dominant role in increasing the labor force participation
rates of single mothers. Grogger (2003) looks at the e¤ect of the federal EITC expansions
and nds it to be the single most important policy measure for explaining the decrease in
welfare and the rise in work and earnings among female-headed families.
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) look at the e¤ect of federal EITC expansions from 1984-1996
on the labor supply of married couples, to nd that increasing the EITC credit had a small
positive impact on the labor supply of the husband, but a larger negative e¤ect on the wives
labor supply, due to the marginal rate in the phase-out range. Hence, their nding suggests
that EITC expansions reduced total family labor supply, and that the EITC is e¤ectively
subsidizing married mothers to stay at home. This is consistent with the earlier ndings by
Dickert et al (1995) and Ellwood (2000), who, using structural and quasi-experimental meth-
ods respectively, conclude that EITC does reduce the labor force participation of married
women with children.
Neumark and Wascher (2001) exploit state level variation in EITC to see its e¤ect on
poor families. In order to get around the problem of endogeneity, they control for the
state unemployment rate and welfare generosity. Analyzing a period from 1985-1994, when
seven states implemented EITC supplements, they conclude that an increase in a states
EITC supplement helps families rise above poverty-level earnings by inducing labor market
entry in families that initially did not have an adult in the workforce. Leigh (2005) also
75
uses variation in the state EITC supplements to examine the e¤ect of the EITC on pretax
wages. Using data from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group
for the period 1984-2002, he uses variation across states in the presence and generosity of
state EITC add-ons to create cross-sectional variation in the average tax rate faced by women
with children. He nds a very strong negative e¤ect of the credit on wages especially for low-
skilled workers, implying very little benet of the credit for its nominal recipients. However,
he nds no e¤ect of the credit on the wages of college graduates, and although workers
with children receive a more generous tax credit than childless workers, the hourly wages of
both groups are similarly a¤ected by an increase in the generosity of the EITC. Leigh also
uses an instrumental variable startegy by constructing a simulated instrument for the EITC
parameters in an employees labor market, to nd that wages respond to variation in the
fraction of eligible employees and the average EITC rate, but do not respond to changes in
the marginal EITC rate.
Our work goes along the lines of Leigh, but using additional variation with more states
o¤ering their own EITC programs in the recent years6, and focussing on the labor force
participation rates and week worked as outcomes, which he did not analyze specically.
Also, we use a richer set of regressors in di¤erent specications to measure the presence and
magnitude of the EITC o¤ered by both the state and the local governments. This includes
using the maximum credit received in some specications, the phase-in rate in others, or
whether the state is o¤ering a sizeable enough credit in some other specications. We focus
here on married women in order to investigate whether added EITC payments from the
state and local governments contribute to increasing the female labor force participation,
above and beyond the positive impact that the federal EITC expansions have been shown to
have on the national female participation trends. We do the analysis separately for married
women with one child, married women with 2 children, and married women with 3 or more
children so that we can control for the compositional e¤ects that could arise because the
fertility rates have not been constant over time.
6Eight more states enacted the state EITC supplement since Leighs analysis in 2002.
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More recently, Cancian and Levinson (2006) have examined the e¤ect of the EITC on
labor supply comparing outcomes in Wisconsin, which supplements the federal EITC for
families with three children di¤erently, to outcomes in the states which do not supplement
the federal EITC. They nd no e¤ect of the EITC on labor force participation, which is
somewhat surprising given the ndings of previous research. Ho¤man (2007) looks at the
e¤ects of a non-refundable state EITC supplement considering the example of Delaware
and nds atypical distributional impacts of this policy. Specically, he nds that the lower
income half of the EITC recipient population is ineligible for the Delaware non-refundable
EITC. Married couples and both single-parent and two-parent families with less than two
children often lose eligibility and substantial portions of the benets. Thus treating EITC as
a tax relief, as in a non-refundable EITC, rather than income support operating through the
tax system, eliminates the advantages of an EITC program. This nding encourages us to
use additional variation by grouping together states with and without non-refundable EITC
programs and see how female labor force participation rates vary between them.
4.4 DATA AND MAIN RESULTS
4.4.1 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
The data we use come from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation
Group, and the March CPS for the period 1984-2006. The CPS is the monthly household
survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to measure labor force participation
and employment of about 60,000 households per month. In the Outgoing Rotation Group
surveys, every household that enters the CPS is interviewed each month for 4 months, then
ignored for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4 more months. The usual weekly earning
questions are asked only to households in their 4th and 8th interview. New households enter
each month, so one fourth of the households are in an outgoing rotation each month. The
March CPS is an annual demographic le of between 50,000 and 60,000 households per year,
and includes detailed labor market and income information.
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Our primary sample includes women of prime working age (between 18 and 55 years).
In order to determine the EITC eligibility, we consider any member of the household who is
under the age of 19 years (or under 24 years if a full-time student) to be a dependent child
for tax purposes7. There are potential limitations with the MORG data. From January 1994
until October 1999, the basic monthly CPS (from which the MORG sample is drawn) did
not ask respondents for their number of children. For this period, therefore, The MORG
records for January 1994 to October 1999 were merged with the March CPS records for the
same years, resulting in a successful merge rate of around 75 percent. We exclude women
who are self-employed, ill or disabled, or in school full time during the previous year. We
also exclude women with positive earned income but zero hours of work. The resulting size
of the primary sample, after pooling all 22 years is 2,117,003 observations.
Table 24 presents summary statistics for the primary sample separately by family size
and marital status. The demographic variables used in the analysis include age, race, mar-
tital status, education, number of children, labor force participation rates and the state
unemployment rate. Summary statistics show that married women are older and have about
the same education levels as the single women, and this is true for women both with and
without children. Of interest is the pattern of labor force participation. The participation
rate is lower for married women compared to single women, but declines more sharply with
the rst child in case of married women.
Table 25 presents the labor force participation rates of women separately by marital
status and the number of children, between states with and without state EITC supplements,
as well as for all of the states together. As mentioned above, the labor force participation
rates are lower for married women with children, compared to single women both with and
without children. However, the labor force participation rates for married women (both with
and without children) are higher in the states which supplement the federal EITC, compared
to those states which do no o¤er any such state program. This is further evidenced in Figure
7Due to data limitations, we omit some criteria for determination of eligible children- we assume that the
residency requirement is met.
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Table 24: Labor Force participation rates by demographic groups
Single Married
No child 1 child 2+ children No child 1 child 2+ children
Labor Force
(all states)
0.89
(0.30)
0.86
(0.34)
0.86
(0.34)
0.88
(0.31)
0.83
(0.37)
0.82
(0.38)
Labor Force
(EITC states)
0.89
(0.30)
0.86
(0.34)
0 .86
(0.33)
0.89
(0.30)
0.84
(0.36)
0.83
(0.37)
Labor Force
(non-EITC
states)
0 .89
(0.31)
0.86
(0.34)
0.86
(0.34)
0.87
(0.32)
0.83
(0.37)
0.81
(0.38)
Observations
(all states)
211048 131704 555046 420248 253610 544831
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
The data are from survey years 1984-2006 of the Merged Ongoing Rotation Groups and March CPS. The
sample contains women between the ages of 18 and 55 years. We exclude women who are self-employed.
LFP: Labor force participation, which equals 1 if employed or unemployed, and zero if the individual is not
in the labor force. Education: 1 refers to less than high school, 2 refer to high school degree, 3 refer to some
college, 4 refer to college degree and 5 refer to advanced degree.
3, which shows the labor force participation rates of single and married women between
1986-2006, in a four-year period interval.
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Table 25: Summary Statistics
Single Married
No child 1 child 2+ children No child 1 child 2+ children
LFP 0.89
(0.31)
0.86
(0.34)
0.86
(0.34)
0.88
(0.31)
0.83
(0.37)
0.82
(0.38)
Age 32.56
(11.73)
31.54
(10.26)
32.07
(10.67)
41.04
(10.49)
36.64
(8.86)
36.62
(7.67)
Education 2.72
(1.00)
2.53
(0.95)
2.75
(1.06)
2.80
(1.08)
2.77
(1.08)
2.79
(1.08)
Children 0
(0)
1
(0)
2.86
(0.34)
0
(0)
1
(0)
2.86
(0.34)
Black 0.16
(0.37)
0.21
(0.40)
0.15
(0.36)
0.06
(0.24)
0.07
(0.26)
0.07
(0.26)
Hispanic 0.06
(0.25)
0.09
(0.28)
0.08
(0.28)
0.05
(0.22)
0.07
(0.26)
0.09
(0.29)
Other 0.04
(0.20)
0.04
(0.19)
0.05
(0.21)
0.04
(0.20)
0.05
(0.21)
0.05
(0.22)
Observations 211048 131704 555046 420248 253610 544831
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
The data are from survey years 1984-2006 of the Merged Ongoing Rotation Groups and March CPS. The
sample contains women between the ages of 18 and 55 years. We exclude women who are self-employed.
LFP: Labor force participation, which equals 1 if employed or unemployed, and zero if the individual is not
in the labor force. Education: 1 refers to less than high school, 2 refer to high school degree, 3 refer to some
college, 4 refer to college degree and 5 refer to advanced degree.
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS
A key goal of the EITC is to redistribute income to working poor families. In practice, the
EITC is an important income source for many vulnerable families, including many single-
mother families making the transition from welfare to work under recent welfare reforms. To
many analysts, the EITC is preferable to other programs aimed at low-income families be-
cause it is tied to work. For families with a single worker earning low wages, the more hours
worked, the greater their EITC. Thus, given its basic structure, the EITC unambiguously
targets resources to low-income working families.
A less certain advantage of the EITC is its ability to increase labor supply. We analyze
the labor market impacts of the implementation of all the state and local governments
EITC supplement using Current Population Survey data from 1984 to 2006.to examine the
labor market consequences of the EITC. We nd that the labor force participation rates
for married women with children are higher in states which supplement the federal EITC
program, compared to single women both with and without children in the states which do
not provide any such supplement.
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Table 26: 2SLS Estimates of the E¤ect of Phone measures on Store closures
2SLS
(1)
2SLS
 (2)
Phone 15.073
[26.357]
(37.467)
3.105
[2.269]
(2.140)
Controls for state fixed effects?
Yes No
Observations 245 245
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation. Standard errors
in parenthesis are robust. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years 2003 and 2007. All the regressions
are weighted by population and include year-fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the
proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. Column (2) reports results for regressions without
including the state-fixed effects.
Table 27: Store closures based on the type of store
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Average number of Indie
Store closings
1.755
(0.31)
6.89
(1.18)
3.26
(0.72)
5.69
(0.91)
6.81
(1.53)
Average number of Others
Store closings
1.53
(0.29)
5
(0.85)
4.06
(0.70)
10.45
(1.86)
4.51
(0.77)
Average number of Chain
Store closings
2.14
(0.33)
4.23
(0.64)
4.25
(0.65)
10.19
(1.75)
3.89
(0.55)
Average number of Big Box
Store closings
1
(0.72)
1.84
(0.32)
2.07
(0.42)
1
(0.32)
2.35
(0.51)
Average number of Other
Store closings
0.22
(0.08)
1
(0.19)
0.43
(0.12)
0.78
(0.23)
0.78
(0.21)
Total number of
Store closings
160 593 363 801 557
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The abbreviations for the states pertain to the State Fips Code classified by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The store closings data are from Almighty Research for the years 2003 through 2007.
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Table 28: Summary Statistics: Store closures based on the type of store between states
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The states are classified as urban or rural depending on the percentage of people in each
state having a telephone connection in the 1960 Census. The internet penetration data are from CPS Computer Use and
Supplements for the years 1997-1998, 2000-2001, 2003 and 2007. The store closings data are from Almighty Research for the
years 2003 and 2007.
Overall VFL States Non-VFL
States
Urban
States
Rural
States
Indie Store
Closures
4.89
(0.47)
8.08
(0.97)
2.94
(0.37)
5.31
(0.68)
4.33
(0.54)
Others Store
Closures
5.11
(0.49)
8.62
(1.06)
2.97
(0.35)
5.59
(0.69)
4.52
(0.63)
Chain Store
Closures
3.98
(0.42)
6.6
(0.91)
2.38
(0.31)
4.39
(0.61)
3.46
(0.51)
Big box  Store
Closures
0.49
(0.07)
0.94
(0.18)
0.23
(0.05)
0.47
(0.08)
0.55
(0.17)
Other Store
Closures
0.64
(0.08)
0.82
(0.006)
0.84
(0.01)
0.73
(0.12)
0.51
(0.09)
Number of
observations
245 95 155 155 85
Table 29: OLS Estimates of E¤ect of State Internet Penetration Rates on Store closures
based on the type of store
Indie
(1)
Chain
Stores
 (2)
Big box
(3)
Other
(4)
Indie
(5)
Chain
Stores
 (6)
Big
box
(7)
Other
(8)
Internet
penetration
rates
1.389***
[0.89]
(1.258)
-0.104
[0.256]
(0.364)
-0.261
[0.214]
(0 .304)
0.245
[0.175]
(0.25)
1.041*
(0.209)
-0.139*
(0.052)
-0.228*
(0.037)
0.238*
(0.028)
Controls for
state fixed
effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation.
Standard errors in parenthesis are robust. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years 2003 and
2007. All the regressions are weighted by population and include year-fixed effects. ***denotes significance at the
1% level. *denotes significance at the 10% level. In columns (5) through (8) a heteroskedastic error structure with no
cross-sectional correlation is assumed. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the proportion of
female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year.
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Table 30: Reduced-form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on Store closures based
on the type of store
Indie
(1)
Chain
Stores
 (2)
Big box
(3)
Other
(4)
Indie
(5)
Chain
Stores
 (6)
Big box
(7)
Other
(8)
VFL 4.516**
[2.26]
(2.522)
9.044
[5.74]
(6.61)
-0.106
[0.447]
(0.426)
0.941
[0.769]
(0.977)
2.797*
(0.89)
4.241*
(1.21)
-0.192
(0.24)
0.372*
(0.18)
Controls for
state fixed
effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation. Standard
errors in parenthesis are robust. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years 2003 through 2007. All
the regressions are weighted by population and include year-fixed effects. Columns (1) through (4) reports results for
regressions where standard errors are adjusted to cluster at the state level. In columns (5) through (8) a heteroskedastic
error structure with no cross-sectional correlation is assumed. Other controls include population, mean education, age,
and the proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year.
Table 31: First Stage Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on State Internet Penetration
Rates: Falsication test
Internet penetration
rates
(1)
Internet penetration
rates
 (2)
Internet penetration
rates
 (3)
Internet penetration
rates
 (5)
VFL -0.398
(0.928)
[0.634]
-0.337
(1.447)
-0.316
(0.721)
[0.854]
-0.306
(1.893)
Controls for state fixed
effects? Yes Yes No No
Observations 276 276 276 276
Notes: The Internet penetration data are from CPS Computer Use and Supplements for the years 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2007. All the regressions are
weighted by population and include year fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the proportion of female, white, black and
Hispanic for each state-year. Column (1) shows results when the standard errors are clustered at the state level, in brackets and when standard errors are adjusted
for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation, in parenthesis. Column (2) reports results from GLS estimation. Columns (3) and (4) reports
results for regressions without including the state-fixed effects.
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Table 32: Reduced Form Estimates of the E¤ect of VFL Adoption on State Internet Pene-
tration Rates: Falsication test
Store closures
(1)
Store closures
 (2)
Store closures
 (3)
Store closures
 (4)
Panel A VFL 13.469
(11.842)
[9.977]
7.245
(6.268)
5.623***
(1.995)
[2.938]
8.384***
 (1.266)
Panel B               VFL 6.572
(4.712)
[6.436]
2.202
(1.620)
8.628***
(3.029)
[3.728]
8.876***
(1.436)
Controls for state fixed
effects? Yes Yes No No
Observations 218 218 218 218
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years 2003 through 2007. Panel A denotes results pretending
VFL was adopted in 2003. Panel B reports results pretending VFL was adopted two years prior to the actual period when it was adopted. ***denotes significance
at the 1% level. All the regressions are weighted by population and include year fixed effects. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the
proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. Column (1) shows results when the standard errors are clustered at the state level, in brackets
and when standard errors are adjusted for unknown forms of heteroskadasticity and serial correlation, in parenthesis. Column (2) reports results from GLS
estimation. Columns (3) and (4) reports results for regressions without including the state-fixed effects.
Table 33: Estimated Probit Models for the Adoption of Video Franchise Laws
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Per capita state GDP and household income are scaled by
thousand. The state business ranking data are from Tax Foundation's State Business Tax Climate Index;
State GDP, Household income and unemployment rates data are from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
***denotes significance at the 1% level. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the
proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year.
Pr(VFL)
(1)
Pr(VFL)
(2)
Pr(VFL)
(3)
Pr(VFL)
(4)
Pr(VFL)
(5)
Business ranking 0.0006
(0.0009)
0.001
(0.001)
Per Capita State GDP -0.001
(0.002)
-0.0007
(0.002)
State unemployment
rates
0.046***
(0.015)
0.043***
(0.014)
Household income 0.001
(0.005)
0.002
(0.004)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245
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Table 34: Regression of VFL adoption on state characteristics
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Per capita state GDP and household income are scaled by
thousand. The state business ranking data are from Tax Foundation's State Business Tax Climate Index;
State GDP, Household income and unemployment rates data are from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
***denotes significance at the 1% level. Other controls include population, mean education, age, and the
proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. All regressions include the state-fixed
effects and year-fixed effects.
VFL
(1)
VFL
(2)
VFL
(3)
VFL
(4)
VFL
(5)
Business ranking 0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
Per Capita State
GDP
-0.010
(0.014)
-0.012
(0.013)
State
unemployment rates
0.062***
(0.031)
0.063***
(0.030)
Household income 0.011
(0.014)
0.012
(0.015)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245
Table 35: Reduced-form regression including additional covariates
Store closures
 (1)
Store closures
 (2)
VFL 8.344***
(1.739)
7.490***
(1.735)
Business ranking 0.102***
(0.041)
Per Capita State GDP 0.512**
(0.293)
State unemployment
0.384
(0.915)
Controls for state fixed effects? Yes Yes
Observations 245 245
Notes: Results are from FGLS estimation. The store closures data are from Almighty Retails for the years
2003 through 2007. ***denotes significance at the 1% level. Per capita state GDP and household income are scaled
by thousand. All the regressions are weighted by population. Other controls include population, mean education, age,
and the proportion of female, white, black and Hispanic for each state-year. Column (1) shows results without including
any additional controls. Column (2) shows results including state GDP, business ranking and megastores. All regressions
include year-fixed and state-fixed effects.
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Table 36: Falsication: The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law
and states with TDI before FMLA assuming FMLA adopted in 1981
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD.adj1 DDD.adj2 DDD.adj3
Treat Pre'81 0.686 0.680
Pos'81 0.684 0.674 0.005
Control Pre'81 0.539 0.543
Obs.675,816 Pos'81 0.552 0.568 -0.012 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.017
standard
errors
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Alt. Control Pre'81 0.924 0.912
Obs.963,726 Pos'81 0.919 0.908 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
standard
errors
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
marital
status?
no yes no yes
linear time
trend?
no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre '81 period consists of the years 1978 - 1980. Pos’ 81 period consists of 1981-1984. Robust
Standard errors are reported.
Table 37: The estimates of Female Labor Force Participation rates between Connecticut and
states with no law before FMLA
Connecticut Only
FMLA
DD DDD DDD
adj.1
Alt. Treat Pre 97 0.582 0.595
Pos 97 0.684 0.588 0.108
Control Pre 97 0.700 0.685
Obs. 27,884 Pos 97 0.758 0.703 0.039 0.069 0.068
standard errors (0.079) (0.079)
Alt. Control Pre 97 0.885 0.912
Obs. 56,190 Pos 97 0.883 0.913 -0.002 0.111 0.112
standard errors (0.074) (0.073)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status.
Pre 97 years are '94-'96. Pos 97 years are '97-'99.
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Table 38: The estimates of FLFP rates between Vermont and states with no law before
FMLA
Vermont Only
FMLA
DD DDD DDD
adj.1
Alt. Treat Pre 98 0.575 0.599
Pos 98 0.666 0.587 0.104
Control Pre 98 0.750 0.692
Obs. 27,672 Pos 98 0.771 0.709 0.005 0.099 0.099
standard errors (0.081) (0.076)
Alt. Control Pre 98 0.899 0.912
Obs.54,698 Pos 98 0.915 0.915 0.013 0.091 0.088
standard errors (0.076) (0.076)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status.
Pre 98 years are '95-'97. Pos 98 years are '98-'00.
Table 39: The estimates of Female Employment between California and states with no law
before FMLA
California Only FMLA DD DDD DDD
adj.1
Treat Pre04 0.787 0.807
Pos 04 0.764 0.783 0.001
Control Pre 04 0.745 0.745
Obs. 143,023 Pos 04 0.744 0.739 0.005 -0.005 -0.004
standard errors (0.124) (0.012)
Alt. Control Pre 04 0.921 0.921
Obs. 193,978 Pos 04 0.903 0.905 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
standard errors (0.008) (0.008)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status.
Pre 04 years are '01-'03. Pos 04 years are '04-'07.
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Table 40: The estimates of Female Employment between California and states which ex-
panded FMLA
California Exp. FMLA DD DDD DDD
adj.1
Treat Pre 04 0.843 0.831
Pos 04 0.819 0.814 -0.006
Control Pre 04 0.704 0.801
Obs. 54,838 Pos 04 0.702 0.795 0.004 -0.013 -0.012
standard errors (0.016) (0.016)
Alt. Control Pre 04 0.904 0.927
Obs. 74,235 Pos 04 0.886 0.910 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
standard errors (0.012) (0.012)
marital status? no yes
linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status.
Pre 04 years are '01-'03. Pos 04 years are '04-'07.
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Table 41: Weekly Benet amount and Duration of Benets in TDI states
State Status Weekly Benefit Amount Duration
CA All
workers
$50-$336 based on schedule of high
quarter wage
6 – 52 weeks, $300 - $14,472, computed as
lesser of 52 x weekly benefit amount or the
total of base period wages.
Duration separate from UI
HI Employed
workers
$14-$357. For an average weekly
wage of less than $26, weekly benefit
amount is the average weekly wage
up to a maximum of $14. If average
weekly wage is $26 or more, weekly
benefit amount is 58% of average
weekly wage with a maximum of 66-
2/3 percent of average weekly wage.
Uniform 26 weeks in benefit year
Unemploy
ed worker
Same as UI Balance of weeks claimant would have been
eligible for benefits in his UI benefit year
but not more than 26 weeks.
NJ Employed
workers
$68-$470 (based on schedule of
average weekly wage). Average
weekly wage determined by dividing
wage from 1 employer during base
weeks in weeks. If less than average
using all employment during last 8
weeks, use earnings from all
employers.
Computed as lesser of 26 x weekly benefit
amount or 1/3 base period wages. Limit
applies to benefits in any 12 consecutive
month periods. Duration separate from UI
and from benefits as an unemployed disable
worker.
Unemploy
ed worker
$61-$475 (based on schedule of
average weekly wage). Average
weekly wage determined by dividing
wage from 1 employer in all base
weeks by numbers of base weeks. If
not 20 base weeks with any 1
employer, average base weeks with
all employers.
15-26 weeks, $1,095-$9,464 computed as ¾
weeks, but not more than 26 x weekly
benefit amount. Duration under UI and
disability during employment limited to
150% of duration for either program
separately.
NY All
workers
$20 - $170 on basis of one-half average
weekly wage in last 8 weeks, or portion
thereof, in covered employment prior to
commencement of disability.
If average is less than $20, weekly
benefit is average wage.
Uniform potential 26 weeks in any 52
consecutive weeks or for any single period of
disability, $520 (or less if weekly benefit amount
is less than $20 - $4,420). Duration separate
from UI.
RI All
workers
$53 - $588 (4.62% of high quarter wages
up to 85% of state’s average weekly
wage in preceding calendar year, plus the
greater of $10 or 7% of the individual’s
benefit rate for each dependent up to 5
dependents).
12 - 30 weeks $636 - $17,640 computed as 36%
of total base period wages plus dependent
allowance if any.
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Table 42: Classication of the States
States TDI FMLA
only
Expa.
FMLA
No
weeks
No
Hours
No Workers Others
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
District of
Columbia
X
X
X
X
X
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
16
12
12
12
1000
1250
1250
75 or more
15 or more
21 or more
25 or more
10 or more
accrued sick leave
accrued sick leave
accrued sick leave
accrued sick leave
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